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Abstract 
While a large literature suggests an important role for political parties in economic development, 
this is the first attempt to lay out a comprehensive theory and a reasonably comprehensive 
empirical test of the proposition. We argue that strong parties broaden the constituencies to 
which policy makers respond and help politicians solve coordination problems. These features 
help ensure better economic management, public services, and political stability. And this, in 
turn, enhances economic growth.  
Drawing on a novel measure of party strength from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, 
we test this theory on data drawn from more than 150 countries, observed annually from 1900–
2012. We identify a sizeable effect which is robust to various specifications, estimators, and 
samples. The effect operates in both democracies and autocracies and is fairly stable across 
regions and time periods. We also find provisional evidence in favor of causal mechanisms 
pertaining to public services and political stability.  
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Introduction 
Many scholars of international development subscribe to some version of institutionalism. They 
believe that the vast cross-country differences in development evident today are the product of 
varying political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2011; Haggard et al. 2008; 
Hall & Jones 1999; Huntington 1968; Knack & Keefer 1995; North 1990; Rodrik et al. 2004; 
Rothstein 2011). The story is plausible but hard to prove, prompting skepticism from some 
quarters (e.g., Aron 2000; Chang 2011; Glaeser et al. 2004; Przeworski 2004; Sachs 2003; 
Vollrath 2014).  
Several impediments to falsifiability impair this research agenda. First, institutional 
theories are often pitched at a high level of abstraction, relying on concepts such as good 
institutions, inclusion, accountability, predation, rent-seeking, or good governance that are open 
to many interpretations and operationalizations (e.g., Jütting 2003). Relatedly, measures of 
institutional quality are often highly aggregated and highly correlated, making it difficult to 
distinguish one institutional feature from another. They may also be limited in temporal or 
spatial coverage, or of questionable validity when placed on the right side of a causal model 
(Arndt & Oman 2006; Kurtz & Schrank 2007; Thomas 2010). Leaving aside problems of 
measurement and collinearity, it is difficult to envision the ceteris paribus conditions of an 
argument centered on the role of “good institutions.” 
Ambiguously framed and hard to operationalize, institutional theories seem to explain 
everything, or nothing. Even for proponents of the institutional story there is a vexing lack of 
specificity. Institutions matter, concludes Bardhan (2005), “but which ones?” Accordingly, we 
propose to shift attention from the macro-level to the meso-level, where arguments and 
empirical tests promise greater tractability – though less comprehensiveness. (What follows is 
emphatically not a comprehensive theory of economic development.) 
We argue that a key institution fostering long-term country-level development is the 
organization of political parties. Strong parties enhance growth by incentivizing leaders to cater 
to broad interests and enable them to solve coordination problems. In contrast to prior work, we 
argue that these capabilities transcend regime-type; they matter as much for economic growth in 
democratic contexts as in authoritarian contexts, and for many of the same reasons. The theory 
we put forth thus bridges two traditions of work on political parties, one focused on democracies 
and the other on autocracies.  
To test the theory we draw on a unique dataset from the Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2015a). Based on coding by thousands of country experts and 
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covering most sovereign and semi-sovereign states over the past century, V-Dem provides 
multiple indicators focused on different features of political parties, which we employ to 
construct a composite index of Party Strength. Using this index, we conduct myriad tests to 
probe the relationship between political parties and economic growth. Estimators include fixed 
effects, generalized method of moments (GMM), and instrumental variables.  
In Section I, we present our theoretical argument about how and why party strength 
affects economic growth. In Section II, we describe our data and the construction of the index 
of Party Strength. In Section III, we explore country cases in East and Southeast Asia, which 
provide a face validity test for the index and an illustration of our theoretical argument. In 
Section IV, we estimate the impact of Party Strength on growth in a global sample. In Section V, 
the relationship is subjected to a series of specification tests. In Section VI we explore the impact 
of Party Strength on economic stability. In Section VII, we conduct several empirical tests 
focused on causal mechanisms. In Section VIII, we review the argument and discuss its 
ramifications.  
 
I. Theory 
A large literature extending back to the birth of modern political science attests to the 
importance of political parties in establishing conditions for democratic stability and 
accountability (Bryce 1888; Key 1949; Ranney 1962; Schattschneider 1942; Wilson 1908). More 
recently, scholars have demonstrated the capacity of strong parties to resist clientelism and 
provide public goods, functions that presumably enhance economic performance (Croissant & 
Volkel 2012; Hicken & Kuhonta 2014; Hicken, Kollman & Simmons forthcoming; Keefer 2013; 
Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2006; Levitsky 1998; Mainwaring & Scully 1995; Pierskalla 
& Fernandez 2011; Powell & Tucker, 2013; Randall & Svåsand 2002; Simmons 2016; Simmons 
et. al. forthcoming; Tommasi 2006; Ufen 2008).  
Meanwhile, a distinct literature on autocratic regimes finds that institutionalized parties 
help to stabilize authoritarian rule (Boix & Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2009; Greene 2007; 
Huntington 1968; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Magaloni & Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012). Researchers 
have also noted that one-party regimes are associated with greater investment and stronger 
growth performance than other types of autocracies (Gandhi 2008; Gehlbach & Keefer 2011; 
Keefer 2007; Miller 2015; Wright 2008), though problems of causal identification persist 
(Pepinsky 2014).  
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A schematic review of the literature on political parties in democratic and autocratic 
contexts thus suggests that the strength of political parties matters in very different contexts. 
This is not to say that parties operate identically in democratic and autocratic settings. Where 
multi-party elections exist parties are in direct competition with each other, which is bound to 
change their policymaking role in some respects. However, the impact of parties on economic 
growth may depend less on inter-party dynamics than on intra-party dynamics, i.e., the way in 
which parties are organized.1 Sweden (a strong-party regime within a democratic context) is 
different from Papua New Guinea (where parties are small, weak, evanescent, and subordinate to 
individual politicians), just as China (where all power is centralized in the Chinese Communist 
party) is different from Saudi Arabia (a party-less monarchy). In both democratic and autocratic 
contexts we expect the strength of political parties to affect the incentives and behavior of elites, 
i.e., the choice of public policies and the effectiveness with which those policies are implemented 
– and, ultimately, long-term growth performance.  
At this juncture, we need to define several key terms. When referring to political parties 
we are primarily concerned with the major parties within a polity, not the smaller and (for our 
purposes) less consequential ones. In polities where only one party is allowed to compete this is 
the only party of theoretical interest. In party systems that are highly fragmented but where long-
standing coalitions perform the work of large parties (i.e., they act in a coordinated and 
predictable fashion), coalitions perform the function of major parties. 
Party strength refers to the unity, centralization, organizational complexity, and mass 
constituency of parties in a country. Where these traits are lacking – i.e., parties are weak or 
absent – other forms of political organization predominate. Non-party formats may be 
characterized broadly as personal rule, either familial or charismatic (Jackson & Rosberg 1982), 
group-based rule, where ethnic, racial, or religious groups form the basis of power (Wimmer 2013), 
or military rule (Finer 1988; Huntington 1957). These are the causal counterfactuals of our 
argument. To the extent that parties are weak, we assume that governance is monopolized by an 
individual and his/her clique, a social group, or a military junta. 
It may seem axiomatic that strong parties are preferable to these other forms of political 
organization. Nonetheless, it is important to specify – albeit in rather broad terms – why strong 
parties might facilitate stronger growth performance over the long term. Parties, we surmise, 
                                                      
1 Work on parties in democracies usually focused on the “external dimension” of party system institutionalization, 
i.e., patterns of inter-party competition. Our conceptualization of party strength leans toward the “internal 
dimension” of party system institutionalization, i.e., party organizational structures and party rootedness in society 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995 Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Ufen 2008; Croissant and Volkel 2012; 
Hicken and Kuhonta 2014; Powell and Tucker, 2013). The literature on autocratic parties, naturally, focuses mainly 
on the latter (e.g., Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2006; Gehlbach & Keefer 2011; Svolik 2012), with some attention to 
linkages between opposition party actors and the ruling party (e.g., Gandhi 2008). 
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align the interests of leaders with the interests of the party, thereby (1) imposing constraints on 
leaders, (2) institutionalizing power, and (3) elongating time-horizons. Parties also serve as 
coordination mechanisms among powerful groups and interests within a society by virtue of (4) 
their encompassing-ness, (5) their ability to overcome veto points, and (6) their effective 
implementation of policies. Let us unpack these relationships.  
First, strong parties provide a mechanism for constraining leaders so that they fulfill the 
ambitions of the party rather than (or in addition to) their personal ambitions. Constraints on 
leaders stem partly from the process of leadership selection, which in a strong party favors 
individuals with a demonstrated commitment to the party, usually those who have risen through 
the ranks. Organization men, not mavericks, are likely to emerge from a party-centered selection 
process (Carreras 2012). The chosen individual, having been thoroughly socialized in the party, is 
unlikely to work against its wider interests once installed in a top policymaking position. Nor is it 
likely that a leader would be able to deviate from the party line, even if s/he so desired. Strong 
parties provide checks against wayward leaders, employing internal mechanisms of control, often 
of an informal nature (Panebianco 1988; Gehlbach & Keefer 2011, 2012; Svolik 2012). Indeed, 
party activists and officials may resist actions by the executive if they conflict with their interests 
and the long-term interests of the party (Stokes 1999). Note also that party leaders need party 
members; they cannot afford to alienate their base. More generally, a tightly organized party 
structure – where members are in continual contact with one another and have long-standing 
personal relationships – allows party members to better overcome collective action problems and 
thus serve as an effective counterweight to the top leadership (Svolik 2012).  
For these reasons, we expect a modicum of accountability operating within a strong 
party, even when there are no formal institutions mandating anything that might be described as 
intra-party democracy. As evidence of this, one might consider the capacity of strong parties to 
limit the tenure of rulers and, in some cases, to control the leadership selection process in 
autocratic settings such as Vietnam (after Ho Chi Minh), China (in recent years), and Mexico 
(under the PRI). It follows that we may regard the political party as providing a credible check on 
executive power, preventing predatory behavior that might harm long-run growth in much the 
same fashion as is claimed for formal, constitutional constraints (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001; 
Besley & Kudamatsu 2008; North & Weingast 1989; Wright 2008). 
Second, strong parties establish highly institutionalized spheres of politics and 
policymaking. They may or may not be transparent in formulation, but they are clear in 
execution so that investors and other actors know what to expect. More important, once 
adopted, policies are likely to be sustained, and this track-record means that strong parties can 
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credibly commit to policies. Market uncertainties associated with unpredictable policy swings are 
minimized, and growth performance should be enhanced. More generally, the institutionalization 
of political conflict – and of leadership succession in particular – should enhance political 
stability over the long run. Extant work suggests that polities ruled by strong parties are less 
susceptible to civil war (Fjelde 2010), an event with strongly negative repercussions for growth 
(Collier 1999; Gates et al. 2012).  
Third, strong parties are enduring. Because of this longevity leaders and others whose 
interests are aligned with a party’s fate are compelled to approach policymaking with a long-term 
perspective. Studies have shown that a party’s image and overall support among the citizenry is 
colored by the policies and overall performance achieved during periods when the party ruled 
(Magaloni 2006). Legacies matter. This means that parties that expect to stick around for a while 
are likely to have an incentive to invest in policies that are anticipated to increase long-term 
growth, even if they impose short-term costs (Hankla 2006; Pitcher 2012). For example, a strong 
party is more likely to prioritize productive public investments in infrastructure and human 
capital over less productive public spending and to promote policies conducive to private 
investment, even though the gains from such policies accrue slowly over many years (Olson 
1993; Simmons 2016). 
Fourth, strong parties often promote an encompassing vision (an ideology intended to 
embrace most, if not all, citizens), a leadership cadre that includes representatives of major social 
groups, and a large membership base. A strong party is typically broad, and attempts to fuse its 
mission and identity with the nation. Groups who are integrated into a party will also be 
integrated into politics and this, in turn, may serve to vitiate dissent and rebellion. The 
encompassing vision, and (envisioned) constituency, of a strong party may encourage leaders to 
prioritize public goods over targeted distribution of private goods, with positive repercussions 
for growth (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Knutsen 2011a). Likewise, the sheer size of a strong 
party means that clientelistic payoffs – designed to compensate party members and supporters – 
are unlikely to be viable over the long term unless coupled with strong growth performance. 
Distributive politics may work for a stretch; but, in the absence of economic growth party elites 
will be unable to refill their coffers indefinitely (Morgan 2011). There is simply not enough pelf 
to go around. Growth is the only solution that will placate members of a large party, not to 
mention broader constituencies whose allegiance the party claims. 
Fifth, strong parties can serve as vehicles for formulating objectives and overcoming 
potential veto points – whether located within government, in informal institutions, or in the 
private sector. In particular, cohesion among elites is enhanced, allowing party leaders to resolve 
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coordination problems among themselves – striking deals that involve intertemporal tradeoffs 
and enforcing those deals through time (Boix & Svolik 2013; Hicken & Simmons 2008; Kuhonta 
2011; Magaloni 2006; McGillivray 1997; Müller 2000; Nielson 2003; Svolik 2012; Tommasi 
2006). Focusing on democratic settings, Gerring & Thacker (2008: 36-37) propose that 
“wherever parties are weak, policies are necessarily the product of ad hoc coalitions and 
individual interests,” whereas a strong party “synchronizes individual career goals with the party’s 
quest for political power.” In an autocratic setting, Magaloni (2008) shows how party 
organizations, with their associated side-payments, perks and opportunities for future positions 
and influence, strengthen the incentives of different actors to invest in the current regime. This 
means that strong-party governments should be capable of reaching authoritative decisions on 
important matters of public policy and making these decisions stick, establishing credible 
commitment even in the absence of formal constitutional constraints (Gehlbach & Keefer 2011).  
Finally, strong parties are better able to implement policies, once adopted. This includes the 
implementation of routine policies needed for investment and growth (e.g. tax collection, 
enforcement of property rights), where there is often a gap between formal rules and informal 
practice. This also includes the implementation of more sweeping efforts to transform societies 
and economies, providing a level of organization, discipline, and direction that would otherwise 
be lacking. Strong parties have overturned class relations, ensuring that the state is not the 
handmaiden of traditional elites. They have developed infrastructure. They have penetrated 
remote countryside hamlets. They have served as agents of modernization, with all its attendant 
disruption and more than occasional cruelty. They often share a vision of state-supported 
development, but have been willing to abandon ideas and programs, switching course when 
needed (Levitsky 2003). Strong parties are thus a potent tool for modernizing underdeveloped 
societies, with party leaders providing central direction, activists performing the grunt work, and 
the state apparatus, sometimes in conjunction with para-military organizations, providing 
coercive mechanisms (Haggard 1998; Huntington 1968; Hutchcroft & Rocamora 2003; Kuhonta 
2011; Pempel 1990; Slater 2010; Woo-Cummings 1999). Party-led modernization, in turn, may 
serve as a precursor to long-term growth (Murphy et al. 1989). 
The foregoing features – constraints on leaders, institutionalization of power, elongated 
time-horizons, encompassing-ness, overcoming veto points, and effective policy implementation 
– should, in turn, enhance policy outcomes that are generally regarded as conducive to growth. 
First, party strength should mitigate predatory policies and economic mismanagement, e.g., when 
calibrating monetary and fiscal policies, thus promoting investment and limiting inflation. 
Second, party strength should provide productivity-enhancing public services such as 
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infrastructure, education, and health, with follow-on effects on economic productivity by virtue 
of lowering transaction costs and improving human capital (Mankiw et al. 1992). Third, party 
strength should ensure political stability by institutionalizing power – assuring peaceful 
leadership transitions, allowing for peaceful bargaining, and keeping order. More generally, party 
strength should guarantee a predictable policy environment, in which policy commitments are 
credible, which should encourage growth (Alesina et al. 1996; Rodrik 1991). 
The disparate mechanisms of our explanatory sketch are summarized in Figure 1. This 
is evidently a multi-pronged theory and not one that can be reduced to a single explanatory 
framework. The literature on political parties, upon which our account is based, suggests that 
party strength initiates a variety of secondary factors, each of which is likely to have important 
consequences for economic performance. Our aim is to capture the most important elements of 
this complex, macro-level relationship.  
Even so, our theoretical discussion presents a stylized view of the subject. There are, 
for example, many exceptions to the patterns sketched above. Strong parties do not always play 
heroic roles, as the disastrous Great Leap Forward campaign in China attests (Dikotter 2010) – 
though one might point out that this episode occurred during a period when a charismatic leader 
over-shadowed the party apparatus. In any case, on balance, and compared with the alternatives 
– personalistic rule, group-based rule, and military rule – the case for parties as vehicles of economic 
development seems plausible. 
 
Figure 1:  The Argument Summarized 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Party Strength 
Leadership incentives 
1. Constraints 
2. Institutionalization 
3. Time-horizons 
Coordination 
4. Encompassing-ness 
5. Overcome veto points 
6. Policy implementation 
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II. Party Strength 
Party strength, as defined initially, refers to unity, centralization, organizational complexity, and a 
mass constituency. To operationalize this concept we employ six indicators from the V-Dem 
dataset. These measure the extent to which political parties within a polity are characterized by: 
(1) permanent national party organizations, (2) permanent local party branches, (3) centralized 
mechanisms of candidate selection, (4) legislative cohesion, (5) minimal party switching (where 
elected members of a party change their party affiliation in between elections), and (6) 
programmatic (rather than clientelistic) linkages to their social base. Indicators are aggregated 
through simple addition to form a Party Strength index, reflecting the expectation that each 
element of the index is partially substitutable. 
Further detail on these indicators, and discussions of how they map onto the 
definitional attributes of the key concept, is contained in Appendix B. It bears emphasis that the 
empirical results shown in subsequent tables are robust to the omission of any of these 
indicators. Results are also robust to alternate aggregation rules for the index such as principal 
components analysis or multiplication (see Table B2). 
Figure 2 presents a histogram of the Party Strength index for all 16,098 country-year 
observations in the dataset, revealing a distribution that approximates a normal curve. The index 
varies from -1.68 to 1.41, with median and mean values of 0.02 and 0.00, respectively, and a 
standard deviation of 0.53 (see Table A2). When observed over time across our global sample, 
this shows a slight long-term secular increase with sharp periodic variations – e.g., a strong 
increase right after World War II, and a small decline around 1990 (coinciding with the collapse 
of Communist one-party regimes in Eastern Europe and the introduction of multi-party politics 
in many African countries), as shown in Figure B1. 
Cross-country variation at any given point in time is substantial. Some countries are 
characterized by strong parties (e.g., Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, 
Denmark, and Vietnam with the highest scores in 2011) and others by weak or no parties (e.g., 
PNG, Saudi Arabia, Haiti and Qatar, with the lowest scores in 2011). Point estimates for all 
countries in 2011 are listed in Table B1. Importantly, not all point estimates are clearly 
distinguishable, as signaled by the confidence intervals accompanying each score. 
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Figure 2:  Histogram of Party Strength 
 
 
Convergent validity tests, shown in Appendix C, indicate that our index is associated 
with other indicators often regarded as measures of party strength or institutionalization. For 
example, Party Strength is positively correlated with party age (average age of the three largest 
parties in the legislature) and party system institutionalization (a stable and socially rooted party 
system), and negatively correlated with party vote volatility (change in share of votes received 
from election to election), as shown in Table C3. In sub-sets of relatively autocratic countries, 
Party Strength is much higher in regimes categorized as Single-party, One-party, or Dominant 
Multi-party, than in regimes categorized by Geddes et al. (2014) or Hadenius & Teorell (2007) as 
Personalist, Military, or Monarchic (see Tables C1 and C2).  
By contrast, the Party Strength index is only modestly associated with commonly used 
measures of good governance (e.g., the Worldwide Governance Indicators) and democracy (e.g., 
Polity2). To be sure, Party Strength is somewhat higher in democracies and in countries that 
exhibit higher degrees of rule of law and control of corruption (see Table C4). Yet, the modest 
correlations suggest that our index is not reducible to these ancillary concepts and probably 
enjoys some independence from these macro-level institutions (as conventionally measured). 
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III. Regional Analysis 
To provide further validation of the index, and to preliminarily check some of our theoretical 
expectations, we begin our empirical foray by exploring a region of the world that exemplifies 
enormous variation in party development. By common understanding, “East and Southeast 
Asia” includes Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, North and 
South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. We exclude micro-states (e.g., 
Hong Kong, Singapore) and countries generally classified as part of the Oceanic region (e.g., 
Australia, Papua New Guinea).  
While some regions feature parties that are generally quite strong (e.g., Western 
Europe), and others feature parties that are generally quite weak (e.g., Africa), East/Southeast 
Asia illustrates extreme diversity. As such, this region provides an ideal setting for a most-similar 
style analysis, where variation in the causal factor of interest is maximized while variation on 
background conditions is minimized (Gerring 2007). Of course, being situated in the same 
geographic region does not entail that ceteris paribus conditions have been achieved. Nonetheless, 
it provides some ex ante plausibility for making cross-country comparisons given that countries in 
the same region are likely to share many cultural, geographic, and historical features.  
The literature on the developmental trajectories of East and Southeast Asia has focused 
on explaining the rapid growth and development of the so-called high performing Asian 
economies. Chalmers Johnson (1982) initiated a tradition of work on the developmental state 
with his study of Japan, which was followed by studies of the four “tiger” economies (Taiwan, 
South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong),2 and the “mini-tigers” (Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand).3 A common theme in this literature is the importance of a strong state that can engage 
in long-term developmental planning, establish developmental priorities, mediate between 
competing interests, and coordinate tasks among various public and private stake-holders.  
Most strong states were run by strong parties. With some exceptions, high performing 
Asian economies were governed by dominant parties that enjoyed long time-horizons, had the 
power to maneuver around potential veto points, could shield the bureaucracy from special 
interests, and could effectively oversee policy implementation.4 While these tasks might still be 
carried out without a strong party (as the Thai case demonstrates), much of what scholars have 
attributed to strong states may well be a function of strong parties. Arguably, by focusing on state 
                                                      
2 See Amsden 1989; Cheng 1990; Wade 1990; Haggard 1990; World Bank 1993; Rodrick 1995; Evans 1995; Campus 
and Root 1996; Woo-Cummings 1999. 
3 See Lim 1983; Bowie 1991; Doner 1991, 2009; McVey 1992; MacIntyre 1994. 
4 Again, there are important differences among states along each of these dimensions. See MacIntyre 1994 for 
example. 
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capacity the literature has neglected the political capacity embedded in political parties (Leftwich 
1995, 2008).  
This impression is bolstered when comparing Party Strength (as measured by our 
index) with growth rates over the postwar period, as shown in Figure 3.5 Countries with strong 
growth trajectories (e.g., China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and Malaysia) are generally characterized 
by stronger parties. The index is centered on zero so positive scores signal above-average score 
across the entire sample, which includes most sovereign and semi-sovereign countries globally, 
1900-2012. 
 
Figure 3:  East & Southeast Asian Cases at a Glance  
 
Party Strength and per capita GDP growth averaged across the 1946-2012 period.  70% High Posterior Density 
Intervals based on posterior distribution of point estimates (see Coppedge et al. 2015b).  Best fit line resulting from 
a bivariate regression of the mean of per capita GDP growth (1946-2012) on the mean of Party Strength (1946-
2012) for the following countries: MMR (Burma/Myanmar), KHM (Cambodia), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), 
JPN (Japan), LAO (Laos), MYS (Malaysia), PRK (North Korea), PHL (Philippines), KOR (South Korea), TWN 
(Taiwan), THA (Thailand), VTN (Vietnam).  
                                                      
5 The slope of the best fit line in the graph is 1.20, remarkably similar to the coefficient (1.59) presented below in 
our baseline test (Table 1, Model 1). 
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Readers will be aware that the group of countries classified as members of the East and 
Southeast Asia region are heterogeneous along a number of dimensions that might be expected 
to affect party strength and economic development. Arguably, a more satisfactory most-similar 
analysis may be attained by focusing on a smaller group of countries that are more homogeneous 
on background characteristics. For this focused comparison, we choose Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand. These four countries have long coastlines and are therefore exposed 
to international currents of trade, technology, and ideas. They have no history of communist 
control or of “total” colonial control exercised by Japan, often regarded as a modernizing force 
(Kohli 1994). Except for Thailand, which was never colonized, they transitioned to 
independence at about the same time. And, they had comparable socioeconomic characteristics 
at mid-century as measured by per capita GDP, education, and urbanization. 
Figure 4 plots Party Strength for these cases over the past century. (This includes periods of 
colonial rule, as coded by V-Dem.) Several features of this comparison are notable. First, 
corresponding with the scholarly consensus, Thailand and the Philippines consistently register 
the lowest levels of party strength. In both countries, parties are generally described as ephemeral 
alliances of convenience, with little commitment to program or ideology and only tenuous 
connections to voters and societal groups (Brownlee 2008; Croissant & Volkel 2012; Hicken 
2006a, 2006b, 2009; Hicken & Kuhonta 2014; Hutchroft & Rocamora 2003; Quimpo 2005; Ufen 
2012). These stand in sharp contrast to Indonesia and Malaysia, where party strength has 
historically been much stronger (Kuhonta 2011). 
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Figure 4:  Party Development in Selected Cases (1900-2013) 
 
Party Strength through time for selected East and Southeast Asian cases, including pre-independence periods. 70% 
High Posterior Density intervals based on posterior distribution of point estimates (see Coppedge et al. 2015b).  
 
The Party Strength index also appears to capture important changes to party systems 
over time, as described in the scholarly literature. For example, the time-series for Thailand 
shows a modest increase in party strength beginning in the late 1990s. This corresponds to 
changes to the Thai party system following the 1997 constitutional reforms and rise of Thaksin 
Shinawatra and the Thai Rak Thai party (Hicken 2006b, 2013). Malaysia displays an increase in 
party strength in the 1950s, reflecting the creation of three ethnically-based parties (UMNO, 
MCA and MIC) and their banding together to form the ruling Alliance—a pact that has formed 
the core of the ruling coalition ever since. Indonesia’s score picks up during the period of 
turbulent party competition after the country’s independence, which pitted secular nationalist, 
Communist, and Islamic parties against each other. It also captures the substantial increase in 
party strength accompanying the creation of Suharto’s ruling GOLKAR party in the late 1960s. 
And, it registers the decline in strength and rootedness of parties corresponding to the return of 
democracy in 1998. The index, finally, shows a modest decline in party strength in Indonesia 
since 2005, which fits nicely with accounts highlighting the deinstitutionalization of Indonesia’s 
party system, which accelerated after the switch to open-list PR in 2008 (Aspinall 2014). 
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Considering more closely the cases of Malaysian and the Philippines, Figure 4 shows a 
large gap in Party Strength for most of their history. Indeed, the differences between these two 
party systems could help account for the developmental disparity between the two countries. 
With its institutionalized and pragmatic parties, Malaysia was poised to “create organizational 
power that is necessary to drive through social reforms, provide capacity and continuity that 
sustain and protect a reform agenda, and maintain the ideological moderation that is crucial for 
balancing pro-poor measures with growth and stability” (Kuhonta 2011: 4). By contrast, the 
Philippines has featured parties distinguished by their lack of interest in programmatic policies 
and a striking lack of institutionalization. At the conclusion of WWII, the Philippines was one of 
the wealthiest countries in the region, behind only Japan and Malaysia. However, beginning in 
the 1970s and extending up until very recently, other countries soared ahead, leaving the 
Philippines as the perennial “sick man” of East/Southeast Asia. One oft-cited explanation 
centers on the role of political parties. Philippine parties “are characterized by factionalism, 
frequent party switching…and party labels that generally mean little to voters or candidates. As a 
result they…are not cohesive unitary actors pursuing unique policy agendas. Rather, they are 
temporary alliances of narrowly oriented politicians primarily concerned with distributing the 
spoils of government…to themselves and their supporters” (Hicken 2008: 223). Among the 
states of East/Southeast Asia, the Philippines stands out with the lowest level of party strength 
as measured by our index (see Figure 3). This, in turn, has contributed to a chronic undersupply 
of collective goods and comprehensive national policies, which by all accounts has stunted 
growth prospects (de Dios & Hutchcroft 2003; Hawes 1992; Hutchcroft & Rocamora 2003; 
Mackie & Villegas 1999). 
A number of scholars link the persistent underperformance of the Philippine economy 
to weak parties. Indeed, few accounts of the country’s development experience omit reference to 
the problem of anemic parties. Taken as a whole, the literature describes weak parties 
undermining growth through four mechanisms, which closely correspond to the argument 
outlined in Section I. First, weak parties are unable to transcend powerful economic interests that 
have long dominated Philippine politics (Hutchcroft 1998). As a result, public policy caters to the 
interests of narrow elites at the expense of broader interests (de Dios and Hutchcroft 2003). 
Second, weak parties, often the vehicles of powerful personalities, are unable to constrain party 
leaders, particularly presidents. Hence, Philippine policy has been dependent on the peculiar 
preferences and personalities of individuals, which, in turn, undermines the predictability and 
credibility of policy (Balisacan and Hill 2003; de Dios and Esfahani 2001; Hutchcroft 2000). 
Third, weak parties have meant that Philippine politicians operate with very short time horizons 
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(Lim and Pascual 2001), yielding chronic underinvestment or inefficient investment in public 
services, human capital and physical infrastructure. Finally, the failure of parties to adequately 
respond to broader societal interests has meant that pressures for reform often take “extra-
parliamentary—and even extra-legal—forms...” (Hutchinson 2001: 57), resulting in periodic 
eruptions of political instability and a concomitant erosion of investor confidence.  
In the following section, we show that the relationship between party strength and 
economic growth is not restricted to the East and South-East Asian context but rather reflects a 
general pattern found throughout the world.  
 
IV. Main Tests 
The empirical tests in this section and the following section include most sovereign countries, 
observed across the past century. We conduct numerous tests on the relationship between Party 
Strength and GDP per capita growth (obtained from Bolt & van Zanden 2014), employing 
different estimation techniques, specifications, samples, time lag specifications, and 
operationalizations of key concepts. It is worth signaling at the outset that the main result – Party 
Strength enhances economic growth – is robust to an extent that has few parallels in the 
literature on institutional determinants of growth.  
We begin with a parsimonious specification, displayed in Model 1, Table 1. Here, 
growth is regressed on Party Strength in an ordinary least squares model along with year and 
country fixed effects, and GDP per capita (logged). The latter is intended to account for 
convergence effects (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004) and the possibility that parties may be stronger 
in richer countries. All right-side variables are lagged one period behind the outcome, and 
(robust) errors are clustered by country to correct for panel-specific autocorrelation. This 
benchmark model incorporates 10,141 observations from 153 countries observed annually from 
1900 to 2012.  
The estimated coefficient and standard error for Party Strength in Model 1 indicate a 
strong relationship with subsequent growth. Based on that model, Figure 5 plots the estimated 
impact of hypothetical changes in Party Strength, surrounded by 95% confidence intervals. 
Holding initial level of income constant, and controlling for country- and year-fixed effects, the 
point estimate suggests that a 1-point increase in the Party Strength index boosts GDP per capita 
growth in the subsequent year by about 1.5 percentage points. A 1-point difference in Party 
Strength is not far from the 0.72-point difference in 2011 Party Strength scores separating the 
cases of Malaysia (0.26) and the Philippines (-0.54), discussed above. Such a difference in party 
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strength has substantial consequences for economic development over time. Model 1 suggests 
that if two otherwise equal countries start out today with the 2011 Party Strength scores of 
Malaysia and the Philippines, respectively, the former will grow to be twice as rich as the latter in 
about fifty years. Subsequent tests introduce variations in this benchmark model to assess the 
robustness of this finding.  
 
Table 1:  Main Tests 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Imputed Full 
Estimator OLS OLS, MoC OLS OLS OLS OLS Sys. GMM 2SLS OLS OLS 
Time-periods 1 year 1 year 5 years 1 year 1 year 1 year 5 years 1 year 1 year 1 year 
Party  1.509*** 1.245*** 1.064***   1.308*** 1.994*** 1.252*** 0.724**  
   strength (0.369) (0.393) (0.358)   (0.328) (0.649) (0.250) (0.342)  
...L10    0.774**       
     (0.367)       
...stock     0.045***      
      (0.014)      
...II          1.070 
           (0.901) 
...III          1.131 
           (0.950) 
...IV          1.886* 
           (0.976) 
...V          1.908* 
           (1.072) 
GDPpc (ln) -1.990*** -2.051*** -2.830*** -1.627*** -2.144 *** -2.225*** -0.468 -2.053*** -2.889*** -1.906** 
  (0.347) (0.371) (0.403) (0.306) (0.367) (0.326) (0.295) (0.194) (0.277) (0.335) 
Growth      0.176*** 0.116*    
       (0.031) (0.649)    
Growth,         0.330***   
   regional        (0.028)   
Growth,         -4.937***   
   global        (0.654)   
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 151 173 153 
Years (Max) 110 110 21 100 110 109 21 109 114 110 
Obs 10141 9835 1817 9427 10147 9985 1814 9846 16342 10147 
R2 (within) (0.112) (0.108) (0.208) (0.103) (0.107) (0.137)  (0.128)+ (0.108)  (0.106) 
 
Outcome: GDP per capita growth. Independent variables lagged by one time-period.  Sample:  Full (all available 
observations).  Imputed: based on ten imputed datasets using Amelia (Honaker & King 2010; see Appendix G).  
Estimator: OLS (ordinary least squares), Sys GMM (system GMM [Blundell & Bond 1998]), 2SLS (two-stage least 
squares), MoC (Method of Composition, 900 draws) (Bizzarro et al. 2016).  Standard errors clustered by country.  
*** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10.   + Centered R-Squared.  Model 1: benchmark.  
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Figure 5:  Party Strength and predicted GDP per capita growth 
 
Predicted growth rates, surrounded by 95% confidence intervals, as a function of Party Strength based on Model 1, 
Table 1, with other independent variables set at their means. 
 
Model 2 replicates Model 1 with the incorporation of uncertainty estimates produced by 
the V-Dem measurement model for the Party Strength index. Note that measurement error, 
while it might be recognized in an informal fashion by those who study country-level 
phenomena, is rarely incorporated into an estimator. V-Dem is virtually unique among 
institutional measures insofar as it draws on multiple coders, whose ratings are combined with a 
Bayesian item response theory (IRT) measurement model to produce an estimate as well as a 
confidence interval (Appendix D; see also Pemstein et al. 2015). Using the method of 
composition (Melton et al. 2010; Bizzarro et al. 2016), we run our benchmark model on the 900 
draws of the posterior distribution estimated for the Party Strength index (resulting from the 
aggregation of the posteriors of each indicator). The resulting coefficients and standard errors, it 
turns out, are very similar to those reported in Model 1, demonstrating that the association is 
robust even when accounting for measurement uncertainty in Party Strength. 
Model 3 in Table 1 employs variables measured across 5-year intervals (rather than 
annually). Specifically, we generate a moving average of all variables and then run the benchmark 
model on every fifth year (1900, 1905,…). This reduces the amount of information available and 
blunts proximal relationships that may exist between Party Strength and growth. However, it also 
reduces noise from short-term business cycles, and models the relationship in a more distal 
fashion (a five-year lag replaces a one-year lag). While the point estimate for Party Strength is 
reduced, the relationship persists and remains statistically significant (p<.01). 
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In Model 4, we return to annualized data but now introduce a longer lag on the variable of 
theoretical interest. Party Strength is lagged ten years behind the outcome, while per capita GDP 
retains its usual one-year lag. This model accounts for the possibility that it might take 
considerable time for party characteristics to influence social and economic policies and for these 
policies to affect the behavior of economic actors. It could also reduce the possibility of spurious 
results (since we are separating right- and left-side variables by a longer interval). The estimated 
impact is somewhat weaker than in our benchmark model, indicating that the relationship 
weakens as inputs and outputs are separated in time. However, the coefficient remains positive 
and statistically significant (p<.05). 
Another approach to functional form, reported in Model 5, considers a country’s 
historical experience with Party Strength as the determinant of growth. Following Gerring et al. 
(2005), we generate a stock variable summarizing Party Strength scores over a country’s observed 
time-series, with an annual discount rate of 1%. The estimated coefficient is positive and highly 
significant, suggesting that Party Strength may have both short-term and long-term effects. This 
result also offers further assurance that the relationship between Party Strength and growth is 
not the product of simultaneity, as the stock variable extends back to 1900 (or the first year in 
which Party Strength is observed for a country). 
In Model 6, we include a lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor in the 
benchmark model. This dynamic model estimates how Party Strength at t-1 affects changes in 
the economic growth rate from t-1 to t. Point estimates and t-values are very close to our 
benchmark model.  
In Model 7, we test more complex dynamic panel model known as system generalized 
method of moments, a version of GMM regarded as appropriate for studying sluggish variables 
such as Party Strength (Blundell & Bond 1998).6 Initial tests using the benchmark specification 
revealed extremely large and highly significant coefficients for Party Strength. However, model 
diagnostics suggest that the overidentifying restrictions may not be valid with annualized data 
due to the large number of instruments. Here, we follow a standard approach for GMM models 
that incorporate long time series, i.e., re-coding annual data at five-year intervals (as in Model 3). 
This reduces the number of time series units and hence the number of instruments, and allows 
for valid identification (following the assumptions of the model). We allow two lags for 
                                                      
6 The system GMM estimator includes level and differences regressions, and accounts for endogenous regressors by 
using lags of levels to instrument for differences and lags of differences to instrument for levels. Two lags (second 
and third) are used for instrumentation to mitigate the “too-many-instruments” problem (Roodman 2009), and 
Party Strength and lagged growth are modelled as endogenous. The Ar(2) test p-value is 0.06, and the Hansen J-test 
p-value is 0.60. We tested various other GMM models, for instance only considering Party Strength as endogenous, 
or altering the number of lagged dependent variables or lags used for instrumentation, and the coefficient on Party 
Strength is quite stable and robust.  
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instrumentation, producing 139 instruments. This is well below the number of cross-sectional 
units (153), often regarded as a rule-of-thumb threshold (Roodman 2009). The Hansen J-test p-
value is 1, suggesting that Model 7 provides consistent estimates. Even when modelling Party 
Strength as endogenous, the GMM model estimates that the short-term effect of a one-point 
increase in Party Strength results in 1.99 percentage points additional growth (significant at 1 
percent), and the long-term effect (βparty strength/(1-βlagged DV) is about 2.25 percentage points.  
In Model 8, we apply an instrumental-variable approach to causal identification. To 
instrument for Party Strength we adopt a technique developed for testing the effects of 
institutional features on economic performance (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Knutsen 2011b; Miller 
2015; Persson & Tabellini 2003). This technique rests on the assumption that institutional forms 
are, in part, the product of diffusion (Weyland 2008). Insofar as we can measure pressures for 
diffusion by taking account the institutional forms adopted by a country’s neighbors, and insofar 
as the institutional evolution of these neighbors has no direct impact on the outcome of interest 
(conditional on other factors in the causal model), we may regard such a factor as a valid 
instrument, satisfying the exclusion restriction.  
Specifically, we construct a variable that measures average levels of Party Strength in a 
region (excluding the country in question) and another variable that measures average values of 
Party Strength globally (also excluding the country in question), with the expectation that these 
regional and global factors predict Party Strength in the country of interest. F-tests of these 
instruments in the first stage regression confirm that they are very strong predictors, explaining a 
substantial amount of variation in Party Strength (see Table E1). We also include as regressors 
two variables measuring average growth rates regionally and globally to mitigate the possibility 
that our diffusion instruments are correlated with economic performance, violating the exclusion 
restriction. The Sargan test of the exclusion restriction (p=0.21) suggests that the chosen 
instruments are valid. If so, the estimated coefficient for Party Strength in Model 8 – which is 
similar to our benchmark model – should provide a consistent estimate of the causal effect of 
Party Strength on growth. To test the stability of this result, we conduct a number of robustness 
tests, employing different sets of instruments and controls, as shown in Table E2. Results 
suggest that our specifications is not susceptible to arbitrary choices of instruments. 
Another threat to inference is posed by sample bias, a product of the fact that data for 
key variables is not available for all countries. To mitigate this problem we employ the Amelia II 
multiple imputation algorithm (Honaker & King 2010), adapted to the cross-section time-series 
structure of our data (for more information see Appendix G). Ten imputed datasets are 
produced, encompassing 173 countries and a time-series extending from 1900-2014. Model 9 
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reports the coefficients for the benchmark model, averaged across these imputed datasets, and 
with standard errors that reflect variability across datasets. The effect of Party Strength on 
growth remains positive and significant (p<.05), although somewhat attenuated relative to the 
benchmark model.  
To explore functional form we construct an ordinal measure of Party Strength 
consisting of dummies representing different levels of Party Strength. Dummies are constructed 
by dividing up the index – which stretches from -1.68 to 1.46 – into five equidistant units. These 
dummies (I-V) replace our continuous measure of Party Strength in Model 10, with the first level 
constituting the reference category. Only the upper categories are statistically significant, as one 
might expect (small increases in Party Strength relative to the baseline are not enough to generate 
an effect statistically distinguishable from zero). For our purposes, the salient result is that the 
coefficients increase monotonically from II to V, suggesting that our index captures the true 
functional form quite well. It also reassures us that the effect reported in the benchmark model is 
not driven by a few unusual cases. 
 
V. Robustness Tests 
In Table 2, we conduct a series of specification tests intended to probe the sensitivity of the 
Party Strength/growth relationship to potential confounders. Variables are defined in Table A1 
and descriptive statistics are shown in Table A2.  
Model 1 is a spare model, including only country and year dummies (excluding per 
capita GDP). Model 2 deals with temporal confounders by measuring one-period changes in the 
main independent variable and economic growth as the dependent variable – a first-difference 
model. Model 3 adds several time-varying covariates to the benchmark specification, including 
urbanization, life expectancy, petroleum production, intra-state armed conflict, and inter-state 
armed conflict. Model 4 adds a number of fixed covariates to the benchmark model including 
ethnic fractionalization, percent Muslim, percent Protestant, land area, legal origin (English, 
French, et al.), regime-type (following the typology from Geddes et al. 2014), and region 
dummies. These variables, which change little, or not at all, across the period of observation, 
replace country fixed effects in a random effects model. Coefficient estimates for Party Strength 
are stable across all of these tests and comparable in magnitude to the benchmark model. 
The final specification tests of Table 2 (Models 5-6) focus on indices measuring the 
quality of political institutions. Model 5 includes several high-level indices drawn from the V-
Dem dataset: Polyarchy (a composite measure of electoral democracy), Rule of Law, Judicial and 
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Legislative Constraints on the Executive, Corruption, State Ownership of Economy, and Core 
Civil Society. Model 6 includes a non-V-Dem measure of democracy: the Polity2 index from the 
Polity IV dataset, often regarded as a summary measure of the quality of institutions. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the estimated effect of Party Strength on growth is even stronger when these 
additional measures of governance are included. Equally surprising, the other institutional 
measures – with the exception of State Ownership of Economy – are not robust predictors of 
growth. 
The inclusion of these indices also mitigates a potential threat to inference stemming 
from the foreknowledge that V-Dem coders have about the “left side” of our causal model. 
Specifically, country experts may be more inclined to assign a high score to a country along some 
institutional parameter during a period in which a country experiences high growth. If so, the 
relationship in our benchmark model could be spurious, a product of coding circularity. 
However, if coding circularity exists we would also expect it to affect other institutional variables 
coded by V-Dem or Polity raters. Moreover, we would expect it to manifest itself more strongly 
with institutional variables that are widely assumed to be associated with economic performance 
such as corruption. The fact that the main result holds even when controlling for these 
subjectively coded institutions alleviates concern about coding circularity.  
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Table 2:  Specification Tests 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Estimator OLS OLS Diff OLS RE OLS OLS 
Party Strength 1.211*** 2.674*** 1.229** 1.022*** 1.979*** 1.947*** 
  (0.333) (1.011) (0.490) (0.318) (0.419) (0.239) 
GDPpc (ln)  -1.762*** -2.543*** -0.627** -2.376*** -0.754*** 
   (0.325) (0.531) (0.285) (0.368) (0.117) 
Urbanization   -3.139    
    (2.762)    
Life expectancy   0.008    
    (0.035)    
Petroleum   0.001*    
    (0.000)    
Internal conflict    -1.298***    
    (0.313)    
External conflict   -0.451    
    (0.467)    
Ethnic fract    -0.752   
     (0.702)   
Latitude (ln)    -0.076   
     (0.168)   
Muslim    -0.001   
     (0.005)   
Protestant    -0.004   
     (0.010)   
Land area    0.000   
     (0.000)   
Polyarchy      -1.389  
     (1.125)  
Rule of Law      0.647  
        (1.396)  
Judicial Constraints      1.652  
       (1.234)  
Legislative Constraints      -1.128  
     (0.886)  
Corruption      0.137  
     (1.239)  
State Ownership of Economy     0.622***  
     (0.163)  
Core Civil Society      -0.669  
        (1.091)  
Polity2      -0.032** 
      (0.013) 
Legal origin (dummies)    ü    
Regime type, Geddes (dummies)     ü    
Region FE    ü    
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü  ü ü 
Countries 153 153 106 136 152 148 
Years (Max) 110 109 107 49 110 110 
Obs 10142 10083 6817 5663 9420 8841 
R2 (within) (0.102) (0.104) (0.117) (0.088) (0.122) (0.106) 
 
Outcome: per capita GDP growth. Unit of analysis: country-year.  FE: fixed effects.  All right-side variables lagged by 1 
year. Estimator: OLS (ordinary least squares), Diff (Difference in Differences), RE (random effects), standard errors 
clustered by country.  *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10. 
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Our theoretical argument about the role of political parties in conditioning growth 
performance is intended to apply across many contexts. To probe the scope-conditions of the 
theory, and to alleviate concerns about influential cases or time-periods, the benchmark model is 
replicated in a series of split-sample tests, shown in Table 3. 
We begin by excluding specific regions of the world – sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific, Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet region, Latin America, the Middle East and North 
Africa. Models 1-5 demonstrate that the relationship between Party Strength and growth persists 
in all of these sub-sample tests. Moreover, the coefficient estimates vary within a fairly narrow 
range (from 1.1 to 1.8) around the estimate from our full sample as shown previously in Model 
1, Table 1. 
To understand more about the robustness of our findings, we divide the sample into 
Western countries (Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand), and non-Western 
countries (the remainder), as shown in Models 6 and 7. Results suggest a somewhat stronger 
relationship between Party Strength and growth in the west – though estimated coefficient in the 
non-western sample (Model 7) is comparable to the benchmark model.  
To test our supposition that the relationship of interest operates similarly across 
regime-types, we divide the sample into democracies (Model 8) and autocracies (Model 9), using 
the binary regime-type index constructed by Boix, Miller & Rosato (2013). The coefficients for 
Party Strength in both models are comparable, and the t-statistics are large, supporting our claim 
that the impact of Party Strength on growth is orthogonal to regime-type. Strikingly, the 
coefficients for Party Strength – as well as for per capita GDP – in both models are considerably 
higher than in our benchmark model (the standard errors are also larger, presumably a product 
of reduced sample size). 
To check for variation through time, we run the benchmark model across a global 
sample extending from 1900 to 1969 (Model 10) and 1970 to 2012 (Model 11). Again, we find 
remarkable consistency. Experimenting with different cut-offs, we find that the point estimate is 
typically somewhat higher for earlier periods but is more precisely estimated for the later periods 
(due, presumably, to the larger sample). The relationship between Party Strength and growth 
does not seem to be subject to strong period effects across the twentieth century.  
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Table 3:  Split-Sample Tests 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Sample 
minus 
sub-Saharan 
Africa 
minus 
Asia- 
Pacific 
minus 
Former 
Soviet 
minus 
Latin 
America 
minus 
MENA Western 
non- 
Western Democracies Autocracies 1900 1969 1970 2012 
Party Strength 1.870***         1.406***         1.138***         1.623***         1.461***         2.705**         1.591***         3.307*** 2.241*** 1.591**            1.188*            
  (0.484)          (0.442)          (0.337)          (0.425)          (0.374)          (0.990)          (0.388)          (1.041) (0.662) (0.719)          (0.702)          
GDPpc (ln)   -2.523***        -2.785***       -1.538***        -1.890***       -1.871***       -5.606***        -1.743***      -5.882*** -2.262***    -5.659***         -3.750***      
  (0.476)          (0.390)          (0.300)          (0.383)          (0.386)          (1.443)          (0.371)          (0.822) (0.629) (1.149)          (0.629)          
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 107 133 125 131 138 20 131 102 123 130 152 
Years (Max) 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 107 100 70 40 
Obs 7442 8653 9128 8287 9259 2149 7936 3573 4901 4654 5487 
R2 (within) (0.134) (0.129) (0.091) (0.119) (0.117) (0.242) (0.109) (0.207) (0.123) (0.132) (0.113) 
 
Outcome: per capita GDP growth. Unit of analysis: country-year.  All right-side variables lagged by 1 year.  FE: fixed effects.  Estimator: ordinary least squares, standard errors clustered 
by country.  *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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VI. Growth Stability  
In gauging the impact of economic growth on human welfare one must be concerned not only 
with average rates but also with stability. A steady growth rate is to be preferred over an irregular 
one, and severe swings in economic performance usually has negative consequences (Rodrik 
2007).  
Our theory suggests that strong parties should foster stable economic performance. In 
Table 4, we provide three tests of this hypothesis. First, we examine whether Party Strength 
reduces the likelihood of economic crisis, understood as an episode of negative per capita GDP 
growth (re-coded as a dummy variable). Second, we examine whether Party Strength enhances 
the likelihood of periods of sustained growth, understood as five years of consecutive growth. 
Finally, we examine whether Party Strength reduces growth volatility, understood as the standard 
deviation of growth performance across a 10-year period. 
Results, shown in Models 1-3 of Table 4, corroborate our hypothesis. Party Strength is 
associated not only with higher growth (as shown in previous tables) but also with more stable 
economic performance. Elaborations of these tests are located in Appendix F, where readers will 
find a more detailed discussion of the chosen measures and estimators. There, we also present 
robustness tests using alternate measures of economic stability and alternate estimators 
(including OLS models). 
Table 4:  Growth Stability 
  1 2 3 
Outcome Growth crisis Sustained growth Growth volatility 
Measure (Growth<0) (Growth>0, 5 years) (Growth SD, 10 years) 
Estimator Logit Logit PCSE 
Party Strength -0.446***        0.658***         -0.553***        
  (0.150)          (0.223)          (0.153)          
GDPpc (ln) 0.221**          -0.718***        -0.043            
  (0.106)          (0.223)          (0.158)          
Year FE ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü  
Countries 152 152 153 
Years (Max) 110 106 101 
Obs 10127 9255 8579 
Pseudo-R2 (0.139) (0.216) (0.181) 
 
Growth crisis: coded 1 if growth is negative.  Sustained growth:  coded 1 if growth is positive in five-year moving 
window.  Growth volatility: standard deviation of growth across a 10-year moving window.  Units of analysis: country-
year.  Independent variables lagged by one time-period.  FE: fixed effects.  Estimator: Logit (logistic regression), 
PCSE (ordinary least squares with standard errors corrected for panel-specific heteroscedasticity and panel-specific 
AR(1) autocorrelation), standard errors clustered by country.  *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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VII. Causal Mechanisms 
Our final empirical task is to interrogate causal mechanisms. In our theoretical discussion we 
speculated that party strength affects growth by enhancing (a) macroeconomic management, (b) 
public services, and (c) political stability. In this section, we provide some suggestive evidence for 
these channels, focusing on factors that are measurable, and hence testable.  
Before beginning, it is important to acknowledge the challenges to causal inference that 
confront any attempt to estimate the role of causal mechanisms (Gerring 2010; Imai et al. 2010, 
2011). These challenges are magnified in a nonexperimental context where the presence of 
multiple potential mediators – not all of which are measurable – must be reckoned with. 
Mediation tests constitute the best available method for investigating causal mechanisms in a 
cross-country context, i.e., with data that lies at the same level of analysis as our treatment and 
outcome of interest. However, we regard these tests as suggestive rather than conclusive, in the 
spirit of most work on causal mechanisms. 
In the following analyses, the quality of macroeconomic management is proxied by 
domestic investment and inflation (logged), the quality of public services by the infant mortality 
rate (logged), and overall stability by measures of internal conflict and irregular leadership exits. 
Definitions of these variables, and their sources, are contained in Table A1. We employ policy 
outcomes, rather than direct measures of policy effort, because the former are generally easier to 
measure and less liable to systematic bias. Note that by including per capita GDP as a covariate 
in these models we are handicapping countries by their available resources and their overall level 
of modernization.  
Temporal and geographical coverage for some of the specified mediators is, 
unfortunately, quite limited. To mitigate selection bias and obtain comparable samples across the 
mediation tests, we use the 10 imputed datasets generated for Model 9, Table 1, for the following 
analyses. Here, we exclude country-years without observations in the original dataset for either 
Party Strength or per capita GDP growth in order to minimize noise introduced by the 
imputation procedures (it is, for example, difficult to precisely predict growth in many Asian and 
African colonies around 1900, several decades before the first GDP data are recorded in the 
Maddison project dataset).  
We perform two types of mediation analysis. First, single mediator analyses are 
conducted with the package developed by Tingley et al. (2014), widely regarded as the state-of-
the-art procedure for causal mechanism analysis in the potential outcomes framework (Blackwell 
2013). Specifications follow the benchmark model, including per capita GDP (logged) and 
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country and year fixed effects. We run the single mediator analysis on each of the 10 datasets and 
aggregate the results using Rubin’s (1987) rules for multiple regressions. Baseline results are 
presented in Table 5. Table H1 in Appendix H includes results for similar analyses using non-
imputed data, which track the results in Table 5 fairly closely. 
Results displayed in these tables provide some support for our hypotheses. Specifically, 
the estimates provided in Table 5 suggest an indirect effect of party strength on growth via 
lowered infant mortality, which accounts for nearly nine percent of the total effect (p<.10). 
Likewise, there appears to be an indirect effect registered through a reduced probability of 
internal armed conflict (p<.10). Additionally, there may be an indirect effect via decreased 
likelihood of irregular leader exit – which, if true, may account for roughly seven percent of the 
total effect, although it falls short of conventional levels of significance (p<.15). Thus, we are 
able to corroborate hypotheses pertaining to the mediating role of public services and political 
stability. In contrast, the evidence does not corroborate the thesis that party strength increases 
growth via improved macroeconomic management, even though point estimates are in the 
expected direction for both investment and inflation. 
 
Table 5:  Summary of Mediation Analyses (Single Mediator tests) 
Direct Effect Mediator (M) Indirect Effect Total Effect Proportion 
(c) (policy outcome) (a)(b) (a)(b) + (c) mediated 
1.146** Investment 0.064 1.210** 
5.3 
(0.497) (Macroeconomic management) (0.069) (0.486) 
1.208** Inflation (logged) 0.004 1.213** 
0.3 
(0.490) (Macroeconomic management) (0.025) (0.486) 
1.103** Infant Mortality (logged) 0.103* 1.206** 
8.5 
(0.479) (Public goods) (0.053) (0.477) 
1.155** Internal Conflict 0.054* 1.210** 
4.5 
(0.486) (Stability) (0.030) (0.481) 
1.127** Irregular Exit 0.080 1.208** 
6.6 
(0.497) (Stability) (0.057) 0.481 
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Y: outcome, i.e., per capita GDP growth.  X: independent variable of theoretical interest, i.e., Party Strength.  M: 
possible mechanisms, i.e., indicators of macroeconomic management, public goods, and stability.  Specification: Model 
1, Table 1. Estimator: Multilevel OLS and Logit using the lme4 package for R (Bates et al. 2015). Mediation effects 
estimated with the “Mediation” package for R (Tingley et al. 2014). Simulations: 1000.  Units of analysis: country-year.  
Countries: 153.  Years: 110.  Observations: 9947. Time periods: Party Strength measured in t, mediators measured at t+1, 
and GDP per capita measured at t+2. Standard errors clustered by country.  *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
 
 
 
 
 
Single-mediator models are subject to bias stemming from omitted mediators. To check 
for confounding, we also run simultaneous regressions within a structural equation framework 
(Baron & Kenny 1986; Kline 2015), including all five mediators from Table 5. Table H2, in 
Appendix H, presents results from one such specification 7 Reassuringly, these results point in 
the same direction as those shown in Table 5. The point estimates suggest substantial positive 
indirect effects running via infant mortality (our proxy for public services) as well as via internal 
conflict and irregular leader exits (both understood as proxies for instability). The indirect effect 
for infant mortality is statistically significant at the 10% level, though indirect effects via 
instability fall short of statistical significance (p<.12-.17). As with the single-mediator models, we 
find much weaker evidence for indirect effects running through inflation and investment 
(proxies for public services).  
In sum, observable proxies of policy outcomes related to public services provision and 
political stability seem to account for some of the effect of Party Strength on growth, offering 
support for two of the hypotheses about the causal mechanisms at work in our theory. To 
reiterate, we regard these results as tentative rather than definitive. Alternative mediators and 
model specifications might produce more informative results about the mechanisms by which 
Party Strength affects economic growth. 
 
  
                                                      
7 More specifically, we run six simultaneous regressions once again following our benchmark model (controlling for 
logged per capita GDP  and country and year fixed effects, with robust errors clustered by country). The first five 
regress the mediator at t+1 on Party Strength at t. The sixth has growth at t + 2 as dependent variable and the five 
mediators (investment, inflation (logged), infant mortality rate (logged), internal conflict and irregular leadership 
exits) at t + 1, as well as Party Strength at t, as independent. We thereafter use multiplication to estimate indirect 
effects. 
X 
M 
Y 
(c) 
(a) (b) 
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Conclusion 
In this study, we argue that strong parties play a critical role in fostering economic development. 
Our theoretical argument highlights how parties broaden the constituencies to which policy 
makers respond and help politicians to solve coordination problems. These features ensure that 
politicians engage in better economic management, have incentives to provide productivity 
enhancing public services, and help ensure political (and thus policy) stability. This, in turn, 
should enhance economic growth. 
Drawing on a novel measure of party strength from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, 
we test this theory on data from 150 countries observed annually across the 20th and 21st 
centuries. We identify a sizeable and highly significant causal effect which is robust to a variety of 
specifications, estimators, and samples. The effect is robust in both democracies and autocracies 
and is fairly stable across various regions of the world and across time periods. We also provide 
suggestive evidence about causal mechanisms, especially public goods and political stability.   
This paper contributes to two large literatures, focused respectively on features of political 
parties and on the institutional determinants of growth. While previous studies have highlighted 
the role of parties in improving the quality of governance such claims are usually limited in 
context – to democratic or authoritarian settings – and generally do not pertain to distal 
outcomes such as per capita GDP growth. Studies of economic development, while focused 
explicitly on growth, generally identify other long-run causal factors such as geography, property 
rights, political constraints, colonial origins, inequality, social capital, or human capital. In these 
respects, the present study is novel.  
With respect to work in the new institutionalist vein it should be pointed out that our 
argument – that “parties matter” for growth – does not impugn the role of the state, as measured 
by formal, legal, and constitutional factors such as federalism, separate powers, the judiciary, the 
bureaucracy, rule of law, and democracy. Nonetheless, our analyses suggest that the character of 
political parties may be a better predictor of subsequent economic performance than these other 
factors (whether measured by indices drawn from the V-Dem project or by other datasets). This 
may reflect our inability to properly measure various features of the state. But it may also signal 
the relative importance of non-constitutional institutions vis-à-vis constitutional institutions in 
structuring long-run development. This echoes an intellectual turn initiated over a century ago by 
the founders of American political science, who shifted their attention from formal-legal 
institutions to other venues – foremost among them, political parties (Bryce 1888; Ostrogorski 
1902; Wilson 1908). 
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Although the evidence for a party-strength/growth connection is strong, several 
ancillary questions bear further study. First, we need to know more about the causes of party 
strength. Why do strong parties develop in some countries and not in others? Second, our 
preliminary analysis of causal mechanisms might be extended and tested in greater depth with 
better measures of intermediary factors. Third, we need to know more about the possible impact 
of party strength on other domestic policies (e.g., social policies) and on international policies 
(e.g., peace/war). If party strength affects growth by changing the incentives of leaders and 
easing coordination problems it stands to reason this same institutional factor might matter for 
other outcomes of interest to scholars and policymakers. We regard these areas a fruitful grounds 
for future research.  
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Appendix A:  Data 
Table A1:  Variable Definitions 
Components of the Party Strength Index 
Party organizations (v2psorgs)  How many political parties for national-level office have permanent 
organizations?  A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for 
carrying out party activities outside of the election season. Responses:  (0) No parties.  (1) Fewer than half of the 
parties.  (2) About half of the parties.  (3) More than half of the parties.  (4) All parties.  Source: V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Party branches (v2psprbrch)  How many parties have permanent local party branches?  Responses:  (0) None.  
(1) Fewer than half.  (2) About half.  (3) More than half.  (4) All.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv)  Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other 
members of their party on important bills?  Responses:  (0) Not really. Many members are elected as 
independents and party discipline is very weak.  (1) More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with 
their parties than against them, but defections are common.  (2) Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of 
the time. (3) Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 
2015a). 
Party linkages (v2psprlnks)  Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to 
their constituents? A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of “good” that the party offers in exchange for 
political support and participation in party activities. Responses:  (0) Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with 
goods, cash, and/or jobs.  (1) Mixed clientelistic and local collective.  (2) Local collective. Constituents are 
rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.  (3) 
Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.  (4) Policy/programmatic.  Constituents respond to a party’s 
positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 
2015a). 
Candidate selection—national/local (v2pscnslnl_neg)  How centralized is legislative candidate selection 
within the parties?  The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between 
local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. One level usually 
dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the 
different levels of party organization. Responses:   (0) National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by 
national party leaders.  (1) National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with 
some limited influence from local or state level organizations.  (2) National legislative candidates are chosen 
through bargaining across different levels of party organization.  (3) National legislative candidates are chosen by 
regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency 
groups.  (4) National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.  (5) 
National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries. Scale reversed.  Source: V-
Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Party switching (v2psswitch_neg)  Roughly what percentage (%) of the members of the national legislature 
changes or abandons their party in between elections? Does not include official party splits (when one party 
divides into two or more parties) or dissolutions (when a party formally dissolves).  Scale reversed.  Source: V-
Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Other variables 
Core Civil Society (v2xcs_ccsi).  Provides «a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys 
autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however 
conceived.» (Coppedge et al. 2015). The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor 
analysis model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) and CSO 
participatory environment (v2csprtcpt). For additional information see Bernhard et al. (2015). Source: V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Political corruption index (v2x_corr). Comprised of six measures of corruption that cover different areas and 
levels of a polity. The index taps into both ‘petty’ and ‘grand’ corruption; bribery and theft; corruption aimed at 
law making and at implementation. Calculated as the average of (a) public sector corruption index (v2x_pubcorr); 
(b) executive corruption index (v2x_execorr); (c) legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt); and (d) judicial corruption 
45 
 
(v2jucorrdc). Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Democracy, Boix (e_boix_regime).  Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. 
Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a 
minimal level of suffrage.  Source: Boix et al. (2013). 
Democracy, Polity2 (polity2).  A weighted additive aggregation procedure across five sub-components: 
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness and regulation of political participation, 
and constraints on the chief executive.  Source: Polity IV database (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2014). 
Ethnic fractionalization (al_ethnic).  The probability that two randomly chosen individuals within a society are 
members of different ethnic groups, calculated with the Herfindahl index.  Source: Alesina et al (2003).  
GDPpc, ln (e_migdppc_ln).  Gross domestic product per capita, transformed by the natural logarithm.  Source: 
Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014). 
Infant mortality rate, ln (e_peinfmor).  Number of deaths prior to age 1 per 1000 live births in a year, 
transformed by the natural logarithm.  Sources: Gapminder (gapminder.org), with additional data imputed from 
Clio-Infra (clio-infra.eu).  
Inflation (e_miinflat).  Annual inflation rate, missing data within a time-series interpolated with a linear model, 
transformed by the natural logarithm (after first converting negative values to positive values).  Source:  Clio Infra 
(clio-infra.eu). 
Internal conflict (e_miinterc).  Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 
otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. 
However, the data contains only 1’s along with missing data (no 0’s). Following the authors’ instructions 
(personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one 
year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.  Sources: Clio Infra (clio-
infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001), compiled by V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a).  
Investment (pwt_isg1).  Share of investment as a percentage of GDP.  Source: Penn World Tables (Heston, 
Summers & Aten 2012). 
Irregular Exit (exit_1_irregular1).  Coded 1 if head of state (“leader”) died of natural causes while in power, 
retired due to ill health, lost office as a result of suicide, lost power through irregular means, or was deposed by 
another state. Source: Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009). 
GDPpc growth (e_migdpgro).  Annual growth rate of GDP per capita.  Source: Maddison Project (Bolt & van 
Zanden 2014).    
Judicial Constraints (v2x_jucon).  The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor 
analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary 
(v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court 
independence (v2juncind).  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Land area (wdi_area).  Land area, square kilometers.  Source:  World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2013). 
Latitude, ln (lp_lat_abst_ln).  The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (so as to take 
values between 0 and 1), transformed by the natural logarithm.  Source:  La Porta et al. (1999). 
Legal origin (lp_legor).  The legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial code of each country, classified as 
(1) English Common Law, (2) French Commercial Code, (3) Socialist/Communist Laws, (4) German 
Commercial Code, (5) Scandinavian Commercial Code.  Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Legislative Constraints (v2xlg_legcon). The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian 
factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive 
oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties 
(v2lgoppart). Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Life expectancy (e_pelifeex).  Expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates. Sources: 
Gapminder (gapminder.org), with additional data imputed from Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).  
Muslim (lp_muslim80).  Muslims as percentage of population in 1980.  Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Party age (partyage).  Average age of three largest parties in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national 
legislature.  Source: Authors. 
Party linkage index (bti_q5).  The extent to which there is a stable and socially rooted party system, able to 
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articulate and aggregate societal interests. This includes a consideration of the extent to which parties are socially 
rooted and organizationally institutionalized, the degree of clientelism and the effects it has in promoting or 
inhibiting stability, the fragmentation of the party system, the level of polarization, and the degree of voter 
volatility (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2014).   
Party vote volatility (total_EV_vote).  Change in share of votes received by each party from election to election 
according to the Pedersen (1979) index.  Source: Authors. 
Petroleum (e_mipetrol).  Real value of petroleum produced per capita.  Source: Haber & Menaldo (2011). 
Political Corruption (v2x_corr). The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption 
index (v2x_pubcorr); (b) executive corruption index (v2x_execorr); (c) the indicator for legislative corruption 
(v2lgcrrpt); and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). For additional information see McMann, 
Kelly et al. (2015). 
Polyarchy (v2x_polyarchy). The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the 
indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr), clean elections 
(v2xel_frefair), elected executive (de jure) (v2x_accex) and freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the 
other, the five-way interaction between those indices. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Protestant (lp_protmg80).  Protestants as percentage of population in 1980.  Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Public administration (PublicAdmin_JG).  The first component derived from a principal components analysis 
of five variables designed to measure the effectiveness of public administration: respect for the constitution by 
members of the executive (v2exrescon), extent to which public officials are rigorous and impartial in the 
performance of their duties (v2clrspct), extent to which the laws of the land are clear, well-publicized, coherent 
(consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner 
(v2cltrnslw), the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials 
are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights 
to counsel, defense, and appeal (v2clacjstm), and the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts 
without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public 
authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal (v2clacjstw).  Constructed by 
the authors.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Regime type (Geddes) (gwf_regimetype_num).  Classification of autocratic regimes into ten categories. Source: 
Geddes, Wright & Frantz (2014). 
Regime type (Hadenius, Teorell) (ht_regtype).  Classification of regimes into eighteen categories.  Source: 
Hadenius & Teorell (2007). 
Rule of Law (v2xcl_rol). The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis 
model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with 
predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights 
for men/women (v2clprptym, 
v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for 
men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), 
and freedom of domestic 
movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew). Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015) 
State ownership of economy (v2clstown). This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and 
controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors. Reverse scale (high values=less 
state ownership). Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015a). 
Urbanization (e_miurbani).  Ratio of urban population to total population.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 
2015), constructed from data from CLIO Infra (clio-infra.eu).  
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Table A2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Party Strength 16229 0.00 0.53 -1.68 1.42 
Party Strength (Stock) 16218 62.09 39.55 0.01 191.24 
Party Strength (Ordinal) 16229 2.17 0.90 0 4 
Party Strength (PCA) 16229 0.00 1.00 -2.47 2.45 
Party Strength (Multiplicative) 16229 0.00 1.00 -0.79 6.83 
Party System Institutionalization 16290 0.45 0.32 0.01 0.99 
Party organizations 16408 0.01 1.65 -3.26 3.28 
Party branches 16415 -0.05 1.61 -3.09 3.56 
Candidate selection (national) 16281 -0.36 1.37 -2.71 4.21 
Legislative cohesion 16245 0.24 1.44 -4.20 2.49 
Party switching 16252 8.95 9.28 0 58.75 
Party linkages 16292 0.06 1.39 -3.13 3.20 
GDP growth 10694 1.93 6.45 -61.49 86.95 
GDP per capita (logged) 10907 7.84 1.04 5.32 10.67 
Regional GDP Growth (mean) 10491 1.92 2.81 -26.36 20.88 
Global GDP Growth (mean) 10694 1.93 1.92 -5.52 7.95 
Urbanization 20764 0.35 0.25 0.01 1.00 
Life expectancy 16610 55.43 14.80 11.60 83.91 
Petroleum 10752 469.87 3087.01 0.00 78588.80 
External Conflict 12932 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Internal Conflict 16612 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization 9416 0.44 0.26 0.00 0.93 
Latitude (ln) 9810 -1.57 0.93 -4.50 -0.33 
Muslim 9863 21.33 34.92 0 99.9 
Protestant 9863 13.26 21.72 0 97.8 
Land area 7904 716523 1755591 2 16389950 
Legal Origin 9863 2.01 0.98 1 5 
Geddes et al. Regimes 7952 4.83 3.83 1 11 
Hadenius and Teorell Regimes 6587 44.36 45.90 1 100 
Boix et al. Regimes 10577 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Polyarchy (V-Dem) 15828 0.34 0.28 0.01 0.96 
Rule of Law (V-Dem) 16491 0.49 0.31 0.00 0.99 
Judicial Constraints (V-Dem) 16313 0.52 0.29 0.01 0.99 
Legislative Constraints (V-Dem) 13201 0.47 0.30 0.02 0.99 
Corruption (V-Dem) 16380 0.44 0.26 0.01 0.94 
State Own. of the Economy (V-Dem) 16491 0.12 1.40 -3.88 3.36 
Core Civil Society Index (V-Dem) 16511 0.47 0.31 0.01 0.98 
Polity Score 11796 0.46 7.31 -10 10 
Average Party Age 5736 30.45 26.44 1.50 153.55 
Electoral Volatility 719 28.92 28.30 0 100 
Party linkages index (BTI) 629 4.79 2.31 1 10 
Control of Corruption 2437 -0.06 1.00 -2.06 2.59 
Government Effectiveness 2437 -0.06 1.00 -2.45 2.41 
Political Stability 2452 -0.06 1.00 -3.32 1.67 
Rule of Law 2492 -0.07 0.99 -2.67 2.00 
Regulatory Quality 2438 -0.07 0.99 -2.68 2.25 
Voice and Accountability 2492 -0.05 1.01 -2.28 1.83 
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Appendix B:  Measuring Party Strength 
The Party Strength Index 
We defined strong parties along four dimensions – unity, centralization, organizational 
complexity, and a mass constituency. Chosen indicators, listed in Table A1, are intended to map 
onto this definition, as discussed below. 
Party organizations measures the extent to which political parties in a country have 
permanent organizations, understood as personnel responsible for carrying out party activities in 
between elections. This speaks most clearly to the organizational complexity of a party, but also 
presumably to the strength of its ties to a mass constituency. 
Party branches measures the existence of permanent local party branches. This, again, 
speaks to organizational complexity and connections to constituencies. 
Legislative party cohesion measures party voting in parliament, i.e., the extent to which a 
party’s representatives vote together on important bills. This provides a direct measure of unity 
and an indirect measure of centralization (and perhaps also of organizational complexity). 
Party linkages measures the predominant relationship between parties and constituents in 
a country, understood along a spectrum from clientelistic (constituents are rewarded with goods, 
cash, or jobs), to localistic (constituents are rewarded with spending targeted on their district), to 
programmatic (constituents’ relationship to a party is based on the party’s policies and overall 
ideology). We regard clientelistic and localistic ties as a measure of decentralization; parties with 
these characteristics are likely to contain strong local leaders who can resist pressures from the 
leadership, perhaps egged on by their constituents. These characteristics are also likely to impair 
party unity, especially if payoffs are discontinued (e.g., by a loss of power or by a fiscal crisis). At 
this point, party members may look around for alternatives, and perhaps even bolt to another 
party that can offer more attractive material incentives. By contrast, if a party is defined by its 
programmatic appeals conflict among its members, or between leaders at the apex and the 
periphery, is likely to be muted, as they agree on most issue-positions and on over-arching goals, 
and have strong incentives to stick together to pursue those goals and may accept leadership cues 
in the service of achieving those goals. Leninist parties are strong, in part, because of their clear 
ideological orientation. 
Candidate selection measures the degree of centralization in the process of nominating 
candidates for the national legislature. At one extreme, all candidates are chosen by national party 
leaders. At the other extreme, candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries 
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and party leaders play a peripheral role. This provides a direct measure of party centralization 
and presumably serves as an important ingredient of party unity. 
Party switching measures the share of MPs who desert their party – either joining another 
party or becoming an independent – in between elections. This serves as a direct measure of 
party unity and an indirect measure of party centralization. 
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Figure B1:  Party Strength Through Time 
 
 
Party Strength, averaged over all countries in the sample, for each year from 1900-2014. 70% High Posterior 
Density Intervals. 
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Table B1:  Party Strength in 2011 
Country Score Interval Country Score Interval Country Score Interval 
Sweden 1.09 0.65 1.52 Croatia 0.34 0.13 0.53 Zimbabwe -0.01 -0.26 0.26 
Germany 1.03 0.75 1.29 Armenia 0.33 0.03 0.63 Gabon -0.02 -0.44 0.38 
Netherlands 0.96 0.64 1.25 Cyprus 0.33 -0.15 0.80 Egypt -0.03 -0.26 0.19 
Spain 0.95 0.70 1.19 Lebanon 0.32 0.00 0.61 Tanzania -0.04 -0.30 0.22 
Belgium 0.87 0.52 1.18 Israel 0.32 -0.04 0.66 Honduras -0.05 -0.33 0.26 
Denmark 0.76 0.36 1.14 Syria 0.31 -0.01 0.64 Maldives -0.05 -0.40 0.28 
Vietnam DR 0.74 0.44 1.02 Azerbaijan 0.30 -0.08 0.65 Ghana -0.06 -0.28 0.16 
China 0.74 0.49 0.94 Iceland 0.30 -0.10 0.68 DR -0.06 -0.33 0.21 
Austria 0.72 0.32 1.06 Sudan 0.30 -0.02 0.60 Ivory Coast -0.06 -0.28 0.15 
Uzbekistan 0.71 0.42 0.95 Kosovo 0.30 0.09 0.51 Comoros -0.06 -0.47 0.32 
New Zealand 0.71 0.40 1.01 Jamaica 0.30 -0.09 0.65 Sao Tome  -0.06 -0.29 0.18 
Norway 0.69 0.35 0.99 Romania 0.30 0.01 0.60 Zambia -0.08 -0.35 0.18 
Portugal 0.66 0.40 0.87 Albania 0.29 0.07 0.48 Yemen -0.08 -0.37 0.20 
France 0.64 0.42 0.86 USA 0.28 0.09 0.48 Paraguay -0.08 -0.29 0.14 
Turkmenistan 0.64 0.34 0.92 Burma  0.28 0.07 0.46 Fiji -0.09 -0.40 0.22 
Finland 0.64 0.31 0.94 Venezuela 0.28 0.00 0.54 Tunisia -0.11 -0.41 0.19 
Tajikistan 0.63 0.33 0.90 Guyana 0.27 -0.08 0.66 Mongolia -0.12 -0.45 0.22 
Uruguay 0.63 0.36 0.90 Ethiopia 0.27 0.02 0.52 Iraq -0.12 -0.47 0.21 
Australia 0.62 0.33 0.91 Bulgaria 0.27 0.03 0.50 Senegal -0.14 -0.40 0.13 
Estonia 0.62 0.33 0.88 Indonesia 0.26 -0.01 0.50 Algeria -0.15 -0.41 0.12 
Czech R. 0.61 0.33 0.86 Bhutan 0.26 0.03 0.47 Uganda -0.15 -0.45 0.14 
Switzerland 0.60 0.30 0.92 Malaysia 0.26 -0.06 0.54 Mali -0.16 -0.38 0.06 
UK 0.58 0.37 0.79 S. Sudan 0.25 -0.08 0.56 Congo, DR -0.19 -0.48 0.11 
India 0.58 0.31 0.85 Serbia 0.25 0.02 0.47 Guinea -0.19 -0.51 0.11 
Poland 0.57 0.31 0.81 Belarus 0.24 0.05 0.44 Congo, Rep -0.23 -0.61 0.18 
Montenegro 0.57 0.32 0.80 Namibia 0.22 -0.03 0.44 Nigeria -0.23 -0.46 0.01 
Greece 0.56 0.23 0.88 Russia 0.22 -0.10 0.52 Jordan -0.24 -0.57 0.10 
Mauritius 0.55 0.18 0.87 Laos 0.21 -0.39 0.79 Cambodia -0.25 -0.55 0.05 
Chile 0.55 0.33 0.73 Georgia 0.20 -0.11 0.45 Guinea-B -0.27 -0.66 0.07 
Mexico 0.54 0.33 0.74 Thailand 0.19 -0.10 0.46 CAR -0.28 -0.55 -0.01 
Turkey 0.54 0.23 0.81 Latvia 0.18 -0.09 0.44 Iran -0.29 -0.59 0.02 
Bangladesh 0.54 0.22 0.85 Costa Rica 0.18 -0.04 0.39 Colombia -0.30 -0.56 -0.02 
Seychelles 0.53 0.22 0.86 Zanzibar 0.17 -0.18 0.52 Eritrea -0.33 -0.72 0.08 
Macedonia 0.51 0.28 0.72 Nepal 0.16 -0.16 0.46 Sierra Leone -0.36 -0.69 -0.03 
Japan 0.50 0.27 0.71 Botswana 0.15 -0.14 0.43 Djibouti -0.37 -0.82 0.08 
Canada 0.50 0.17 0.77 Mozambique 0.15 -0.04 0.35 Mauritania -0.37 -0.81 0.07 
Palestine WB 0.48 0.15 0.82 Lesotho 0.15 -0.13 0.39 Malawi -0.37 -0.73 0.00 
Slovenia 0.47 0.18 0.73 Cuba 0.15 -0.24 0.51 Kenya -0.38 -0.74 -0.04 
Slovakia 0.46 0.16 0.76 Italy 0.14 -0.17 0.45 Solomon Isl. -0.41 -0.76 -0.05 
Trinidad  0.46 0.15 0.75 East Timor 0.13 -0.36 0.56 Peru -0.43 -0.70 -0.13 
Kazakhstan 0.44 0.21 0.66 Gambia 0.12 -0.24 0.48 Benin -0.44 -0.76 -0.11 
Niger 0.44 0.02 0.83 Taiwan 0.12 -0.14 0.40 Swaziland -0.50 -0.85 -0.09 
Suriname 0.44 -0.02 0.85 Ecuador 0.11 -0.09 0.31 Kyrgyzstan -0.50 -0.86 -0.12 
Bosnia  0.43 0.19 0.65 Nicaragua 0.11 -0.17 0.35 Somalia -0.50 -0.96 -0.02 
Barbados 0.42 0.05 0.80 Burkina F. 0.11 -0.12 0.31 Vanuatu -0.54 -1.06 -0.05 
South Korea 0.42 0.11 0.66 Bolivia 0.10 -0.14 0.33 Philippines -0.54 -0.86 -0.25 
Lithuania 0.42 0.14 0.65 Panama 0.09 -0.31 0.49 Afghanistan -0.66 -0.96 -0.34 
Pakistan 0.39 0.14 0.62 Ukraine 0.08 -0.18 0.30 Chad -0.67 -1.01 -0.32 
North Korea 0.39 0.02 0.72 Moldova 0.06 -0.17 0.29 Guatemala -0.71 -1.01 -0.41 
Cape Verde 0.38 0.13 0.62 Somaliland 0.05 -0.32 0.43 Madagascar -0.76 -1.13 -0.37 
Ireland 0.37 0.08 0.67 Angola 0.05 -0.25 0.31 Libya -0.79 -1.40 -0.17 
Palestine Gaza 0.37 0.08 0.64 Morocco 0.05 -0.24 0.32 Liberia -0.79 -1.13 -0.46 
Sri Lanka 0.37 -0.01 0.72 Burundi 0.04 -0.46 0.56 Qatar -1.02 -1.38 -0.62 
El Salvador 0.36 0.10 0.62 Cameroon 0.03 -0.25 0.28 Haiti -1.05 -1.51 -0.58 
Rwanda 0.36 0.01 0.68 Argentina 0.01 -0.23 0.23 Saudi Arabia -1.11 -1.72 -0.46 
South Africa 0.35 0.17 0.51 Brazil 0.00 -0.18 0.20 PNG -1.22 -1.65 -0.73 
Hungary 0.35 0.02 0.67 Togo 0.00 -0.21 0.22         
 
Point estimates for Party Strength for all countries in 2011 along with 70% high-posterior density intervals.  
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Alternative Measures of Party Strength 
Questions can always be raised about the composition and aggregation of an index. Methods of 
indexing involve many choices and readers may be concerned about the extent to which these 
choices color the findings reported here. In Table B2, we systematically test alternate indices in 
the benchmark model to gauge their performance. 
Model 1 shows the benchmark model, in which growth is regressed on our additive 
index of Party Strength, for purposes of comparison. Model 2 tests the first component drawn 
from a principal components analysis of the same six indicators. Model 3 tests an index 
aggregated by multiplying the six indicators together. The next set of tests (Models 4-9) remove 
indicators from the Party Strength index, seriatim. In Model 10, we construct a party strength 
index (using our usual additive method of aggregation) that includes an additional attribute, Party 
nationalization, as measured by the V-Dem dataset. 
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Table B2:  Alternate Indices Tested in the Benchmark Model 
 
 Aggregation techniques Subtracting(-) or adding(+) Indicators to the original index 
Party  
System 
Institution 
-alization 
Index  
Additive 
(original) 
Principal 
components 
Multip- 
licative 
– 
Switching 
– 
Cohesion 
– 
Candidate 
selection 
– 
Linkages 
– 
Organizations 
– 
Branches 
+ 
National 
ization 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Estimate 1.509*** 0.604** 0.429*** 1.343*** 1.382*** 1.173*** 1.377*** 1.473*** 1.408*** 1.414*** 1.297* 
  (0.368) (0.276) (0.154) (0.391) (0.375) (0.333) (0.357) (0.349) (0.359) (0.367) (0.763) 
GDPpc (ln) -1.990*** -1.921*** -1.948*** -1.953*** -2.005*** -1.977*** -1.949*** -1.990 *** -1.982*** -1.929*** -1.889*** 
  (0.347) (0.332) (0.342) (0.341) (0.352) (0.340) (0.348) (0.349) (0.350) (0.348) (0.332) 
Year FE  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Years (Max) 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
Obs 10141 10141 10141 10141 10141 10141 10141 10141 10141 10141 10141 
R2 within 0.111 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.111 0.111 0.110 0.110 0.106 
 
Alternate indices of party strength, along with an index of party system institutionalization, tested in the benchmark model. Estimator: ordinary least squares, standard errors 
clustered by country.  *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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Appendix C: Convergent Validity Tests 
Table C1:  Regime-types (Geddes et al. 2014) 
  
 1 
REFERENCE  
   Democracy - 
MISC  
   Monarchy -0.798*** 
  (-0.022) 
   Oligarchy -0.142** 
  (-0.055) 
MILITARY  
   Military -0.287*** 
  (-0.028) 
   Military / Personal -0.430*** 
  (-0.030) 
   Indirect Military -0.133* 
  (-0.074) 
   Party / Military -0.274*** 
  (-0.039) 
   Party / Military / Personal -0.049 
  (-0.034) 
PARTY/PERSONAL  
   Personal -0.480*** 
  (-0.015) 
   Party / Personal -0.194*** 
  (-0.023) 
   Party 0.031** 
  (0.014) 
Countries 148 
Years 65 
Obs 7653 
R2 0.229 
 
Party Strength index regressed against nominal categories representing regime-types, as defined and coded by 
Geddes et al. (2014). Estimator: ordinary least squares, standard errors in parentheses.  ***p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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Table C2:  Regime-types (Hadenius & Teorell 2007) 
 
 1 
REFERENCE  
  Limited Multiparty - 
MISC  
   Rebel regime -0.189*** 
  (0.056) 
   Civil war -0.319*** 
  (0.052) 
   Occupation -0.250*** 
  (0.079) 
   Transitional regimes -0.123** 
  (0.062) 
   Theocracy -0.493*** 
  (0.072) 
   Other -0.694*** 
  (0.056) 
MILITARY  
   Military no-party -0.350*** 
  (0.060) 
   Military -0.105*** 
  (0.024) 
   Military one-party 0.064** 
  (0.032) 
   Military multiparty 0.195*** 
  (0.032) 
MONARCHY  
   Monarchy -0.870*** 
  (0.043) 
   No-party monarchy -0.451*** 
  (0.045) 
   One-party monarchy -0.227 
  (0.216) 
   Multiparty monarchy -0.140*** 
  (0.059) 
PARTY  
   No Party -1.132*** 
  (0.073) 
   One-party 0.323*** 
  (0.019) 
   Democracy 0.360*** 
  (0.015) 
Countries 166 
Years 39 
Obs 5801 
Adj. R2 0.309 
  
Party Strength index regressed against nominal categories representing diverse regime-types as defined and coded by 
Hadenius & Teorell (2007).  Estimator: ordinary least squares, standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<.01  **p<.05  
*p<.10 
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Table C3:  Other Indicators of Party Performance 
 
 Correlation 
(Party Strength) Countries 
Years 
(max) Obs 
Party age 0.368 154 35 4942 
Party vote volatility -0.240 99 31 719 
Party linkage index (BTI) 0.359 123 5 520 
 
Pearson’s r correlation between Party Strength and other measures. 
 
 
Table C4:  Correlation with Democracy and Governance Indicators 
 
 
Correlation 
(Party Strength) Countries Years Obs 
Polyarchy 0.511 172 115 10873 
Polity 0.319 163 114 11072 
WB Governance Indicators     
   Control of Corruption 0.503 164 13 2112 
   Government Effectiveness 0.545 164 13 2112 
   Political Stability 0.400 164 13 2115 
   Rule of Law 0.533 164 13 2115 
   Regulatory Quality 0.477 164 13 2113 
   Voice and Accountability 0.470 164 13 2115 
 
Pearson’s r correlation between Party Strength and Democracy and Governance Indicators. 
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Appendix D:  Data Collection 
 
The Party Strength index, along with several of the covariates tested in Table 2 (Public 
administration, Rule of law, Corruption control. Property rights, Judicial power, Judicial threats, 
and Civil society freedom), are based on six indicators drawn from the Varieties of Democracy 
(V-Dem) project. It is important, therefore, to understand a bit about how the data was collected 
and aggregated across coders. (For further information see Coppedge et al. (2015) and Pemstein 
et al. (2015).) 
Each indicator in the V-Dem dataset that is not factual in nature is coded by multiple 
Country Experts, generally about five (5). Most experts do not possess the requisite expertise to 
code the entire V-Dem questionnaire, which means that a single country will generally be coded 
by a dozen or more experts, each working on different facets of the questionnaire. To date, V-
Dem has engaged in collaboration with over 2,500 Country Experts. 
 
Recruitment  
The following procedure is used to recruit Country Experts. First, we identify a list of potential 
coders for a country (typically 100-200 names per country). This bulk of names on the list are 
provided by Regional Managers (members of the V-Dem project located in universities and 
think-tanks throughout the world) in consultation with other members of the V-Dem team. 
Assistant Researchers (located at V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg) also contribute to 
this list, using information about potential country experts gathered from the web. Other 
members of the project team provide additional names if they have country-specific expertise. At 
present, V-Dem has accrued a roster of 15,000+ potential Country Experts. 
For each potential Country Expert on the resulting list, we compile basic information – 
country of origin, current location, highest educational degree, current position, and area of 
expertise in terms of the surveys the expert could code as evidenced by a short biographical 
sketch and/or list of publications, website information and the like. We also take note of any 
possible biases that might affect their ability to code questions in a dispassionate manner.  
In selecting whom to recruit from this list five criteria come into play: 
The most important selection criterion, naturally, is expertise in the country(ies) and the 
section of the survey they are assigned to code. This is usually signified by an advanced degree in 
the social sciences, law, or history; a record of publications; and positions in civil society that 
establish their expertise in the chosen area (e.g. a well-known and respected journalist). Naturally, 
potential coders are drawn to areas of the survey that they are most familiar with, and are 
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unlikely to agree to code topics they know little about. So, self-selection also works to achieve 
our primary goal of matching questions in the survey with country-specific expertise. 
The second criterion is origin in the country to be coded. V-Dem’s goal is that a 
minimum of three out of five (60%) Country Experts should be nationals or permanent 
residents of the country they code (preferably both). Exceptions are required for a few countries 
where it is difficult to find in-country coders who are both qualified and independent of the 
governing regime. This criterion should help avoid potential Western/Northern biases in the 
coding.  
The third criterion is the prospective coder’s seriousness of purpose. By this, we mean a 
person’s willingness to devote time to the project, to deliberate carefully over the questions asked 
in the survey, and to report their honest judgment. Sometimes, personal acquaintanceship is 
enough to convince a Regional Manager that a person is fit, or unfit, for the job. Sometimes, this 
feature becomes apparent in communications with Project Coordinators that precede the offer 
to work on V-Dem. 
The fourth criterion is impartiality. V-Dem aims to recruit coders who will answer 
survey questions in an impartial manner. This means avoiding those who might be beholden to 
powerful actors – by reason of coercive threats or material incentives – or who serve as 
spokespersons for a political party or ideological tendency (in some instances, such as North 
Korea, this may entail avoiding all in-country coders). Where this is difficult, or where the reality 
is difficult to determine, we aim to include a variety of coders who, collectively, represent an 
array of views and political perspectives on the country in question. 
The final criterion is obtaining diversity in professional background among the coders 
chosen for a particular country. For certain areas (e.g the media, judiciary, and civil society 
surveys) this entails a mixture of highly recognized professionals from the sector along with 
academics who study these topics. Generally, it also means finding experts who are located at a 
variety of institutions, universities and research institutes.  
After weighing these five criteria, the 100-200 potential experts on the list are given a 
rank from “1” to “3” indicating order of priority.  
The two Project Coordinators at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, then 
handle the enrolment of Country Experts from the list of potential country experts. In handling 
the recruitment, the continuously review the resulting mix of actual country experts in light of 
the five criteria to ensure that V-Dem ends up with a set of experts for each country that fulfill 
our standards.  
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If the quota of five Country Experts per section of the survey for each country is not 
met, we work down the list of potential Country Experts until the quota is obtained. Others, 
following the same procedure, replace those who fail to complete the survey in a reasonable 
time. Coders receive a modest honorarium for their work that is proportional to the number of 
surveys they have completed. 
A number of steps are taken to assure informed consent and confidentiality among 
participants. The on-line survey provides full information about the project (including this 
document) and the use of the data, so that coders are fully informed. It also requires that 
prospective coders certify that they accept the terms of the agreement. They can access the 
surveys only with a randomized username that we assign and a secret password that they create 
themselves. The data they supply is stored on a firewall-protected server. Any data released to 
the public excludes information that might be used to identify coders. All personal identifying 
information is kept in a separate database in order to ensure the protected identities of coders.  
In order to ensure that we are able to recruit widely among potential experts, and in 
order to minimize confusion due to unfamiliarity with English, questions are translated from 
English into five additional languages: Arabic, French, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. 
Approximately 15 percent of the experts code in a non-English version of the questionnaire. 
About 35 percent of the Country Experts are women, and over 80 percent have PhDs 
or MAs and are affiliated with research institutions, think tanks, or similar organizations. 
 
Coding 
Coding is carried out using the V-Dem online survey tool. The web-based coding interfaces are 
directly connected with a postgres database where the original coder-level data is kept, 
maintaining coder confidentiality. 
In addition to country-specific ratings, Country Experts are requested to code several 
additional countries that they are familiar with for a shorter time-slice. This «bridge» or «lateral» 
coding assures cross-country equivalence by forcing coders to make explicit comparisons across 
countries, and provides critical information for the measurement model (described below).  
For each question, and for each country-year, experts are required to report a self-assessed level 
of certainty. This is an indicator of their subjective level of uncertainty for the data point they 
provide. This is scored on a scale from 0 to 100 with substantive anchor points for each 10-
percent interval.  
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Measurement 
Having discussed the process of data collection, we proceed to the task of measurement. Under 
this rubric, we include (a) the questionnaire, (b) our measurement model, (c) methods of 
identifying error in measurement, (d) studies of measurement error, and (e) methods of 
correcting error. In principle, the discussions are relevant for different types of data (A, B, and C 
in the V-Dem scheme) but most if not all of them are much more acute when it comes to 
expert-based coding of evaluative, non-factual yet critical indicators. Hence, most of the 
following is focused on the C-type indicators. 
The most important feature of a survey is the construction of the questionnaire itself. 
In crafting indicators we have sought to construct questions whose meaning is clear and specific 
and not open to a wide variety of interpretations. They should mean the same thing (more or 
less) in each context and not suffer from temporal or spatial non-equivalence. Our methodology 
involves enlisting some of the leading scholars in the world on different aspects of democracy 
and democratization – known as Project Managers.  
Each Project Manager was enrolled because of his/her specific and evidenced expertise 
in a particular area (e.g. legislatures, executives, elections, civil society, and so on) and with a view 
to generate a group that also had substantive experiences and expertise on all regions of the 
world. Starting in 2009, Project Managers designed survey-questions in their area to measure 
democraticness in relation to the different traditions of democratic theory. All suggestions were 
reviewed and refined collectively over the course of two years. The V-Dem pilot test carried out 
in 2011 served as an initial test of our questionnaire, prompting quite a few revisions in the next 
round of surveys. Another round of collective deliberation followed that also involved a number 
of consultations with scholars outside of the project team. The revised questions for C-coding 
thus went through several rounds of review with the Project Managers and outside experts over 
the course of two years before emerging in their final form, depicted in the Codebook. 
Even with careful question design, a project of this nature cannot help but encounter 
error. This may be the product of linguistic misunderstandings (recall that most of our coders do 
not speak English as their first language and some take the survey in a translated form), 
misunderstandings about the way in which a question applies to a particular context, factual 
errors, errors due to the scarcity or ambiguity of the historical record, differing interpretations 
about the reality of a situation, variation in standards, coder inattention, errors introduced by the 
coder interface or the handling of data once it has been entered into the database, or random 
mistakes. 
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Some of these errors are stochastic in the sense of affecting the precision of our estimates but 
not their validity. Other errors are systematic, potentially introducing bias into the estimates that 
we produce.  
Having five coders for each question is immensely useful, as it allows us to identify 
wayward coders as well as to conduct inter-coder reliability tests. These sorts of tests – standard 
in most social science studies – are rarely if ever employed in extant democracy indices.  
While we select experts carefully, they clearly exhibit varying levels of reliability and bias, and 
may not interpret questions consistently. In such circumstances, the literature recommends that 
researchers use measurement models to aggregate diverse measures where possible, 
incorporating information characterized by a wide variety of perspectives, biases, and levels of 
reliability (Bollen & Paxton 2000, Clinton & Lapinski 2006, Clinton & Lewis 2008, Jackman 
2004, Treier & Jackman 2008, Pemstein, Meserve & Melton 2010). To combine expert ratings 
for a particular country/indicator/year to generate a single “best estimate” for each question, we 
employ methods inspired by the psychometric and educational testing literature (see e.g. Lord & 
Novick 1968, Jonson & Albert 1999, Junker 1999, Patz & Junker 1999).  
The underpinnings of these measurement models are straightforward: they use patterns 
of cross-rater (dis)agreement to estimate variations in reliability and systematic bias. In turn, 
these techniques make use of the bias and reliability estimates to adjust estimates of the latent—
that is, only indirectly observed—concept (e.g. executive respect for the constitution, judicial 
independence, or property rights) in question. These statistical tools allow us to leverage our 
multi-coder approach to both identify and correct for measurement error, and to quantify 
confidence in the reliability of our estimates.  Variation in these confidence estimates reflect 
situations where experts disagree, or where little information is available because few raters have 
coded a case. These confidence estimates are tremendously useful. Indeed, the tendency of most 
researchers to treat the quality of measures of complex, unobservable concepts as equal across 
space and time, ignoring dramatic differences in ease of access and measurement across cases, is 
fundamentally misguided, and constitutes a key threat to inference. 
The majority of expert-coded questions are ordinal:  they require raters to rank cases on 
a discrete scale, generally with four or five response categories. To achieve scale consistency, we 
fit ordinal IRT models to each question (see Johnson & Albert 1999 for a technical description 
of these models). These models achieve three goals. First, they work by treating coders’ ordinal 
ratings as imperfect reflections of interval-level latent concepts. Therefore, while an IRT model 
takes ordinal values as input, its output is an interval-level estimate of the given latent trait (e.g. 
election violence). Interval-valued estimates are valuable for a variety of reasons; in particular, 
62 
 
they are especially amenable to statistical analysis. Second, IRT models allow for the possibility 
that coders have different thresholds for their ratings (e.g. one coder’s somewhat might fall 
above another coder’s almost on the latent scale), estimate those thresholds from patterns in the 
data, and adjust latent trait estimates accordingly. Therefore, they allow us to correct for this 
potentially serious source of bias. This is very important in a multi-rater project like V-Dem, 
where coders from different geographic or cultural backgrounds may apply differing standards to 
their ratings. Finally, IRT models assume that coder reliability varies, produce estimates of rater 
precision, and use these estimates—in combination with the amount of available data and the 
extent to which coders agree—to quantify confidence in reported scores. 
With lateral and bridge coding we are able to mitigate the incomparability of coders’ 
thresholds and the problem of cross-national estimates’ calibration. While helpful in this regard, 
our tests indicate that given the sparsity of our data, even this extensive bridge-coding is not 
sufficient in solving cross-national comparability issues. We therefore also employ a data-
collapsing procedure. At its core, this procedure relies on the assumption that as long as none of 
the experts change their ratings for a given time period, we can treat the country-years in this 
period as one year. The results of our statistical models indicate that this technique is extremely 
helpful in increasing the weight given to lateral/bridge coders, and thus further mitigates cross-
national comparability problems. 
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Appendix E:  Instrumental Variable Analysis 
Table E1:  2SLS Results for Model 8, Table 1 (first stage) 
 1 
GDPpc (ln) 0.030*** 
  (0.013) 
Regional growth 0.0006*** 
 (0.0002) 
Global growth 0.002 
 (0.004) 
Regional Party Strength 0.017*** 
 (0.00020) 
Global Party Strength -137.96*** 
 (0.241) 
Year FE ü 
Country FE ü 
Countries 151 
Years (Max) 109 
Obs 9846 
Sargan test p-value 0.183 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 1.7*10^5 
 
  
Outcome: Party Strength. Independent variables lagged by one time-period.  FE: fixed effects.  Estimator: 2SLS (two-
stage least squares); first-stage regression. *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
 
Note that the implausibly large (and negative) value on the global party strength instrument in this particular 
specification is due to the very high correlation with the year dummies (they are not perfectly correlated because 
global growth is always calculated exempting country in question). This is not important to the interpretation of the 
main result, since it is robust, for instance, to substituting the year dummies with a time trend, and to omitting the 
global instrument and only using the regional, as shown in Table E2. Furthermore, the instrument(s) in the first-
stage regressions of these alternative specifications are also always very strong, as indicated by the Cragg-Donald 
Wald F-statistics shown in Table E2.   
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Table E2:  Alternative 2SLS specifications (second stage) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Estimator FE FE FE FE RE RE RE 
Party Strength 4.313* 7.018***                        4.468***         8.107 ***         0.864*** 1.857*** 1.873*** 
  (2.299) (0.946)          (0.914)                   (0.931) (0.128)          (0.487)          (0.482)   
GDPpc (ln) -2.249*** -1.720***        -2.469***        -2.869***       -0.078          -0.402***        -0.449*** 
  (0.290) (0.193) (0.227) (0.233) (0.065)      (0.117)    (0.125) 
Regional growth 0.331*** 0.333***         0.352***                         0.364***         0.385***         0.386*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)  (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Global growth  0.137***         0.139***                        -5.695 ***         0.105**          0.107** 
  (0.043)    (0.042)     (0.661)          (0.042)          (0.042) 
Time trend   ü ü  ü ü 
Year FE ü    ü   
Country FE ü ü ü ü    
Instruments        
   Regional party strength ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
   Global party strength  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 151 151 151 153 151 151 151 
Years (Max) 109 109 109 110 109 109 109 
Obs 9846 9846 9846 10085 9846 9846 9846 
Sargan test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.138 - - - 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 113.85 374.78 387.01 412.81 - - - 
 
Outcome: per capita GDP growth.  Units of analysis: country-year.  Independent variables lagged by one time-period.  
Estimator: two-stage least squares with FE (fixed effects) or RE (random effects), second-stage results only.  Test 
statistics not calculated for random effects models due to software limitations. *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10.  
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Appendix F:  Growth Stability 
In this appendix we probe more deeply into the relationship between Party Strength and growth 
stability, elaborating on discussion presented in Section VI and Table 4. 
First, we examine whether Party Strength reduces the likelihood of economic crisis, 
understood as an episode of negative per capita GDP growth. This is variously coded as less 
than 0, less than -3%, or less than -5%, to generate three dependent (dummy) variables. We find 
that Party Strength is negatively associated with each of these outcomes when tested in our 
benchmark model with ordinary least squares or logistic regression estimators, as shown in Table 
F1. The OLS point estimate suggests that a 1-point increase in Party Strength reduces the 
probability of observing negative growth in the following year by 8 percentage points (29 percent 
of observations have negative growth).  
Second, we examine whether Party Strength enhances the likelihood of periods of 
sustained growth, understood as consecutive years of positive growth sustained across five- or 
ten-year periods. Party Strength is associated with sustained growth episodes when tested in our 
benchmark model using both outcome intervals, and employing either ordinary least squares or 
logistic regression estimators, as shown in Table F2.  
Finally, we examine whether Party Strength reduces growth volatility, understood as the 
standard deviation of growth performance over 10- and 15-year periods. Point estimates from 
these models, shown in Table F3, suggest that Party Strength reduces growth volatility, though 
these estimates are statistically significant only when country fixed-effects are removed. Note 
that when growth volatility is analyzed in a cross-country format the analysis typically does not 
include country fixed-effects (e.g., Easterly et al. 2001). It seems fair to conclude that countries 
with stronger parties not only have higher growth, on average, they also have less volatile growth 
rates.  
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Table F1:  Party Strength and Economic Crises 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Coding of outcome Growth<0 Growth<-3 Growth<-5 
Estimator OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
Party Strength    -0.078***        -0.450***        -0.052**         -0.471**         -0.040**         -0.463* 
  (0.026)          (0.150)          (0.020)          (0.217)          (0.015)          (0.251) 
GDPpc (ln) 0.043**          0.225**          0.045***         0.441***         0.031***         0.462*** 
  (0.018) (0.106)          (0.015)          (0.147)          (0.011)          (0.159) 
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 153 152 153 149 153 146 
Years (Max) 110 110 110 110 110 110 
Obs 10141 10127 10121 10030 10141 9360 
 
Outcome (Y): economic crisis, coded 1 if per capita GDP growth is below a designated value.  Units of analysis: 
country-year.  Independent variables lagged by one time-period.  FE: fixed effects.  Estimator: OLS (ordinary least 
squares), Logit (logistic regression), standard errors clustered by country.  *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
 
 
Table F2:  Party Strength and Sustained Growth Episodes 
  1 2 3 4 
Y measured across… 5 years 10 years 
Estimator OLS Logit OLS Logit 
Party Strength    0.106***         0.658***         0.061**          0.872**          
  (0.033)          (0.223)          (0.030)          (0.380)          
GDPpc (ln) -0.107***        -0.715***        -0.135***        -1.795***        
  (0.032) (0.223)          (0.030)          (0.413)          
Year FE ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü 
Countries 153 152 153 118 
Years (Max) 106 106 101 101 
Obs 9444 9255 8579 6448 
 
Outcome (Y): a prolonged growth period, coded 1 if per capita GDP growth is positive (>0) in consecutive years for a 
5- or 10-year period.  Independent variables lagged by this same time interval.  FE: fixed effects.  Estimator: OLS 
(ordinary least squares), Logit (logistic regression), standard errors clustered by country.  *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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Table F3:  Party Strength and Growth Volatility 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Y measured across 10 years 15 years 10 years 15 years 10 years 15 years 10 years 15 years 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE 
Party Strength -0.458           -0.401           -0.392           -0.391           -0.576***        -0.574***        -0.578***        -0.418** 
  (0.378)          (0.428)          (0.386)          (0.430)          (0.153)          (0.119)          (0.170) (0.177) 
GDPpc (ln)   -0.397           -0.427           -0.499           -0.471           -0.090            0.248**         -0.170           -0.249    
  (0.314)          (0.318)          (0.363)          (0.373)          (0.155)          (0.129)          (0.159)          (0.348) 
Average growth   -0.059 -0.019     -0.061** -0.061   
   (0.060) (0.082)   (0.026) (0.060) 
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü     
Countries 153 152 153 152 153 152 153 152 
Years (Max) 101 96 100 95 101 96 100 95 
Obs 8579 7732 8427 7582 8579 7732 8427 7582 
 
Outcome (Y): standard deviation of per capita GDP growth rate over specified time interval.  Average growth: per capita 
GDP growth over this interval.  Independent variables lagged by one year prior to this interval.  FE: fixed effects.  
Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered by country), PCSE (ordinary least squares with 
standard errors corrected for panel-specific heteroscedasticity and panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation).  *** p<.01  
**p<.05  *p<.10 
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Appendix G: Multiple Imputation 
This appendix provides additional information about the multiply imputed datasets we use in 
Table 1 (Model 9), Table 5, and Table H2. We employ the Amelia II package in R (Honaker, 
King, and Blackwell 2012) to impute 10 datasets with data on Party Strength, Economic Growth, 
the mediators we employ in the mediation section, and a group of additional variables that could 
enhance the imputation of the missing data in the variables of interest, following 
recommendations provided by the software’s developers. Table G1 lists the variables included in 
the imputation and compares descriptive statistics of the original dataset and the imputed 
datasets.  
Results show that there are no substantial differences between the two datasets. Over-
imputation graphs (not shown) also suggest acceptable accuracy of the imputation model. The 
imputation model accounted for the time-series cross sectional nature of the data, as well as it 
included a linear time trend (polytime = 1) to account for secular changes. In order to increase 
numerical stability, we included a ridge prior of 5%. Imputed values were bounded to their 
possible logical values in order to provide more accurate estimates. Table G2 shows the bounds 
adopted. All those specifications are in line with Honaker and his co-authors’ suggested 
specification for this kind of analysis (Honaker, King & Blackwell 2012). 
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Table G1. Descriptive Information about the Original and Imputed Datasets 
 
Variable Obs Missingness (%) 
Mean SD Min. Max. Skewness 
Original Imputed Original Imputed Original Imputed Original Imputed Original Imputed 
Polyarchy 15827 5.46 0.34 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.96 0.98 0.74 0.76 
Party organizations 16382 2.14 0.01 0.00 1.65 1.64 -3.26 -3.26 3.28 3.28 -0.27 -0.27 
Party branches 16383 2.14 -0.05 -0.05 1.62 1.61 -3.09 -3.09 3.56 3.56 -0.09 -0.09 
Party linkages 16260 2.87 0.06 0.05 1.39 1.39 -3.13 -3.13 3.20 3.20 0.22 0.22 
Centralized Candidate Selection 16255 2.90 -0.36 -0.36 1.37 1.37 -2.71 -2.71 4.21 4.21 0.79 0.78 
Legislative Cohesion 16218 3.12 0.25 0.23 1.44 1.46 -4.20 -4.20 2.49 2.49 -0.81 -0.83 
Party switching 16240 2.99 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.83 1.72 1.79 
Inflation (logged) 9214 44.96 5.38 5.81 0.26 0.53 4.92 4.92 10.11 10.11 8.87 0.63 
Infant Mortality 11235 32.89 77.38 127.90 57.26 141.55 1.00 1.00 420.00 2452.76 0.80 3.66 
Life Expectancy 12946 22.67 55.23 52.13 14.75 15.47 11.60 11.12 83.42 83.42 -0.19 -0.04 
Internal Conflict 11525 31.16 0.10 0.12 0.30 0.32 0 0 1 1 2.60 2.36 
GDP per capita (logged) 10457 37.54 7.81 7.94 1.02 0.99 5.32 5.32 10.67 12.25 0.32 0.35 
GDP Growth 10253 38.76 1.89 2.19 6.25 6.49 -61.49 -61.49 86.95 86.95 0.16 0.24 
Investiment 7237 56.77 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.83 1.01 0.99 
Conflict (UCDP) 7212 56.92 0.27 0.41 0.75 0.89 0 0 3 3 2.72 2.04 
Primary Education 5174 69.09 94.88 82.02 24.95 22.62 8.01 8.01 253.81 253.81 -0.87 -0.47 
Tax Ratio 1924 88.51 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.47 0.49 0.66 1.10 
Burocratic Quality 1651 90.14 2.56 1.93 1.18 0.94 0 0 4 4 -0.36 0.24 
Irregular Executive Exit (Archigos) 10997 34.31 0.21 0.27 0.41 0.45 0 0 1 1 1.42 1.02 
 
Descriptive statistics comparing the original dataset used for the imputation and the results from similar analysis of the ten imputed datasets. Imputation done using Amelia II 
(Honaker, King & Blackwell 2012). “Imputed” results are the mean of the descriptive statistics in the 10 imputed datasets.  
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Table G2. Imputation Specification 
Variable Bounds Min Max Set as 
Polyarchy Yes 0 1  
Party organizations Yes -3.2 3.2  
Party branches Yes -3 3.5  
Party linkages Yes -3.2 3.2  
Centralized Candidate Selection Yes -2.7 4.2  
Legislative Cohesion Yes -4.2 2.5  
Infant Mortality Yes 1 400  
Life Expectancy Yes 11 83  
Primary Education Yes 8 100  
Burocratic Quality Yes 0 4  
Party switching No 
  
Ratio 
Inflation (logged) No   Log 
Internal Conflict No   Nominal 
GDP per capita (logged) No   Log 
GDP Growth No   Log 
Investiment No   Ratio 
Conflict (UCDP) No   Nominal 
Tax Ratio No   Ratio 
Irregular Executive Exit (Archigos) No   Nominal 
 
Imputation specifications for Amelia. Bounds were estimated based on the minimum and maximum values existing 
in the original dataset. “Ratio” estimates variables bounded between 0 and 1, “Log” uses logarithmic 
transformations for better imputation of skewed variables, “Nominal” estimates categorical variables. 
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Appendix H:  Mediation Analysis 
This appendix provides further detail about the mediation analyses summarized in section VI. To 
test potential pathways from Party Strength to growth we employ the mediation package 
developed by Tingley et al. (2014), which estimates direct and indirect effects by jointly analyzing 
results of a model predicting the mediator and a model predicting the outcome. The 
relationships of interest are diagramed at the bottom of Table 4. 
All analyses follow the specification of the benchmark model which includes per capita 
GDP (logged) along with country and year fixed-effects. Party Strength and per capita GDP are 
set at t, the mediator at t+1, and growth at t+2. Statistical significance for direct and indirect 
effects in Table 4 are estimated using quasi-Bayesian confidence intervals produced after 1000 
(one thousand) simulations.  
In the first stage of the analysis, a mediator – variously, Investment, Inflation, Infant 
Mortality, Internal Conflict, and Irregular Exit – is regressed on Party Strength and per capita 
GDP. Models predicting Investment, Inflation, and Infant Mortality) are linear mixed models. 
Models for Internal Conflict and Irregular Exit are logistic mixed models with identical 
specifications. In the second stage, growth is regressed on the mediator, Party Strength and GDP 
per capita in a linear model.  
Table H1 replicates Table 4 without imputed data, i.e., with all available data from the 
original variables. Results across these tables are fairly close, despite the differing samples. 
Table H2 presents the results for the analysis of simultaneous multiple mediators, as discussed in 
the text. Here we test for indirect effects of all mediators simultaneously using a structural 
equations approach with the gsem Stata command. Specifications are otherwise identical to those 
presented above. 
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Table H1:  Regression Results for the Mediation Analysis (without imputed data) 
Direct Effect 
(c) 
Mediator (M) 
(po l i cy  out come)  
Indirect Effect 
(a)(b) 
Total Effect 
(a)(b) + (c) 
Proportion 
mediated Observations 
0.775*** Investment -0.014 0.760*** 
-1.8 8928 
(0.604) (Macroeconomic management) (0.075) (0.617) 
0.863*** Inflation (logged) -0.016 0.880*** 
-1.9 7804 
(0.579) (Macroeconomic management) (0.053) (0.585) 
1.053*** Infant Mortality (logged) 0.096*** 1.149*** 
8.4 6427 
(0.524) (Public goods) (0.054) (0.527) 
0.747*** Internal Conflict 0.106*** 0.853*** 
12.4 8074 
(0.498) (Stability) (0.045) (0.505) 
1.264*** Irregular Exit 0.054 1.318*** 
4.1 8556 
(0.586) (Stability) (0.069) (0.565) 
 
Outcome: per capita GDP growth.  Independent variable of interest: Party Strength.  Unit of analysis: country-year.  Country 
and year fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered by country.  *** p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10. 
 
Table H2:  Regression Results for the Simultaneous Mediation Analysis (imputed data) 
Direct effect Mediator (M) Indirect Effect Total Effect 
(c) (po l i cy  out come)  (a)(b) (a)(b) + (c) 
  Investment 0.004   (Macroeconomic management) (0.004) 
  Inflation (logged) 0.001   (Macroeconomic management) (0.005) 
0.083*** Infant Mortality (logged) 0.009* 0.159** 
(0.029) (Public goods) (0.005) (0.068) 
  
Internal Conflict 0.038 
`  (Stability) (0.028) 
  Irregular Exit 0.041   (Stability) (0.027) 
 
Outcome: per capita GDP growth.  Independent variable of interest: Party Strength.  Unit of analysis: country-year.  Country 
and year fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered by country.  Data for 173 countries, for 110 years (max). 9947 
observations total. Time periods: Party Strength measured in t, mediators measured at t+1, and GDP per capita 
measured at t+2. ***p<.01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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